nep-lab New Economics Papers
on Labour Economics
Issue of 2016‒01‒18
six papers chosen by
Joseph Marchand
University of Alberta

  1. Trade Competition, Technology and Labor Re-allocation By Bahar Baziki, Selva; Ginja, Rita; Borota Milicevic, Teodora
  2. The Evolution of Gender Gaps in Industrialized Countries By Claudia Olivetti; Barbara Petrongolo
  3. Competing Auctions of Skills By John Kennes; Daniel le Maire
  4. Working hard in the wrong place: a mismatch-based explanation to the UK productivity puzzle By Patterson, Christina; Sahin, Aysegul; Topa, Giorgio; Violante, Giovanni L.
  5. Collective Bargaining Systems and Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Flexibility: The Quest for Appropriate Institutional Forms in Advanced Economies By Addison, John T.
  6. Coming home without supplies: Impact of household needs on bribe involvement and gender gaps By Asiedu, Edward

  1. By: Bahar Baziki, Selva (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey); Ginja, Rita (Uppsala Center for Labor Studies); Borota Milicevic, Teodora (Uppsala Center for Labor Studies)
    Abstract: This paper studies the changes in labor allocation across firms and industries in response to changes in technology (captured by the adoption of information and communication technologies, ICT) and import competition, due to increased exposure to trade competition from China. We use detailed matched worker-firm data from the Swedish manufacturing sector. We provide new evidence on the mobility of heterogeneous workers across firms and document increased assortative matching of workers in ICT intensive industries. However, the sorting patterns are not uniform across industries within this group. The adoption of ICT along with stronger Chinese import competition results in a significant skill upgrade within high-wage firms. Incontrast,intheabsence of strong pressures in importcompetition, sorting occurs at the low end of the worker-firm distribution, i.e. low-skill workers allocate to low-wage firms. Industries with low ICT intensity do not exhibit any of these sorting patterns. We rationalize our empirical findings through a labor market matching model which is able to explain the increased assortative matching in ICT intensive industries through an increase in the relative demand for qualified workers.
    Keywords: Wage Inequality; Employment Dynamics; Assortative Matching; Import Competition; Technological Change
    JEL: E24 F16 J31 J63 O33
    Date: 2015–12–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uulswp:2016_001&r=lab
  2. By: Claudia Olivetti (Boston College; NBER); Barbara Petrongolo (Queen Mary University; Centre for Economic Performance, LSE)
    Abstract: Women in developed economies have made major inroads in labor markets throughout the past century, but remaining gender differences in pay and employment seem remarkably persistent. This paper documents long-run trends in female employment, working hours and relative wages for a wide cross-section of developed economies. It reviews existing work on the factors driving gender convergence, and novel perspectives on remaining gender gaps. The paper finally emphasizes the interplay between gender trends and the evolution of the industry structure. Based on a shift-share decomposition, it shows that the growth in the service share can explain at least half of the overall variation in female hours, both over time and across countries.
    Keywords: gender gaps, demand and supply, industry structure
    JEL: E24 J16 J31
    Date: 2016–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:889&r=lab
  3. By: John Kennes (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark); Daniel le Maire (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
    Abstract: We generalize McAfee’s (1993) game of competing sellers to the case of heterogeneous sellers. In the generalized McAfee (GM) game, the equilibrium expected job offer distribution of each worker (seller) type evolves over time as a function of stochastic events. We derive a tractable method of solving the GM game. We estimate, using non-parametric methods, a close fit between a benchmark GM game and a cross-section of Danish data on productivity and unemployment. The theoretical properties of the GM game, which relate to on-the-job search, assortative matching, aggregate and match specific shocks, and the equivalence of alternative games, are also characterized.
    Keywords: Auctions, assortative matching, wage dispersion, aggregate shocks, on-the-job search
    JEL: J64 J63 E32
    Date: 2016–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2016-02&r=lab
  4. By: Patterson, Christina (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Sahin, Aysegul (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Topa, Giorgio (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); Violante, Giovanni L. (New York University)
    Abstract: The UK experienced an unusually prolonged stagnation in labor productivity in the aftermath of the Great Recession. This paper analyzes the role of sectoral labor misallocation in accounting for this “productivity puzzle.” If jobseekers disproportionately search for jobs in sectors where productivity is relatively low, hires are concentrated in the wrong sectors and the post-recession recovery in aggregate productivity can be slow. Our calculations suggest that, quantified at the level of three-digit occupations, this mechanism can explain up to two-thirds of the deviations from trend-growth in UK labor productivity since 2007.
    Keywords: misallocation; productivity
    JEL: E24 E32 J24
    Date: 2016–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:757&r=lab
  5. By: Addison, John T. (University of South Carolina)
    Abstract: This paper addresses the design of the machinery of collective bargaining from the perspective of the needs of microeconomic and macroeconomic flexibility. In the former context, greater attention is given over to enterprise flexibility than external adjustment. In the latter context, close attention is paid to changes in collective bargaining along the dimensions of bargaining coverage, structure, and coordination, drawing on Visser’s (2013) welcome update of national collective bargaining institutions; on the basis of which, and recent theoretical developments, specific support is adduced for the German, contemporary Scandinavian, and British models. The role of trust in securing micro and macro flexibility also receives attention, leading to the suggestion that the polder or Dutch model might also be expected to populate the firmament of favored collective bargaining arrangements. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications raised by two developments that have been linked to the retreat of collective bargaining, namely heightened earnings dispersion and a shortfall in worker voice.
    Keywords: micro/macro flexibility, collective bargaining, growth, stabilization, voice, bargaining coverage/structure/coordination, inequality, decentralization, pacts, social pacts, trust, unemployment
    JEL: D02 E02 E24 E25 E61 J48 J50 J51 J52 J53 J58 P51
    Date: 2015–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9587&r=lab
  6. By: Asiedu, Edward
    Abstract: Using a unique data on sub-Saharan Africa, we show that even though in absolute terms men pay more bribes, in relative terms, women are more likely to be involved in bribery or do favors that benefit the household. Additionally, running country specific regressions shows that for 65% of the countries gender differences when household needs are at stake disappear. These results underscore the importance of household needs to the woman, and that the effect of gender on corruption may well be context specific.
    Keywords: service delivery, gender, bribe-involvement, household needs, Africa, Consumer/Household Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, D1, J16, H10, K42,
    Date: 2016–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:gagfdp:229587&r=lab

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