nep-lab New Economics Papers
on Labour Economics
Issue of 2015‒08‒07
seven papers chosen by
Joseph Marchand
University of Alberta

  1. Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement By Frimmel, Wolfgang; Horvath, Gerard Thomas; Schnalzenberger, Mario; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
  2. Job Quality in Segmented Labor Markets: The Israeli Case By Neuman, Shoshana
  3. Regional Commuting in Italy: Do Temporary Contracts Affect the Decision? By Angela Parenti; Cristina Tealdi
  4. Household Surveys in Crisis By Bruce D. Meyer; Wallace K.C. Mok; James X. Sullivan
  5. Accessorizing. The effect of union contract renewals on consumption By Effrosyni Adamopoulou; Roberta Zizza
  6. Hiring and Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluations: A Laboratory Experiment By Andrej Angelowski; Jordi Brandts; Carles Solà
  7. The financial support for long-term elderly care and household savings behaviour By Asako Ohinata; Matteo Picchio

  1. By: Frimmel, Wolfgang; Horvath, Gerard Thomas; Schnalzenberger, Mario; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
    Abstract: In general, retirement is seen as a pure labor supply phenomenon, but firms can have strong incentives to send expensive older workers into retirement. Based on the seniority wage model developed by Lazear (1979), we discuss steep seniority wage profiles as incentives for firms to dismiss older workers before retirement. Conditional on individual retirement incentives, e.g., social security wealth or health status, the steepness of the wage profile will have different incentives for workers as compared to firms when it comes to the retirement date. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for selection of workers in our firms and for reverse causality, we find that firms with higher labor costs for older workers are associated with lower job exit age.
    Keywords: firm incentives; retirement; seniority wages
    JEL: H55 J14 J26 J31
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10729&r=lab
  2. By: Neuman, Shoshana
    Abstract: Till the early-1990s the collectively-bargained labor contract (between the trade-union that presented the employees, and the employer or the employers'-association) was the norm, granting salaried workers a stable and protected labor contract. Thereafter, and more significantly after 1995, the share of unionized workers dropped constantly, to almost half of its peak level (of more than 80 percent). In parallel, two other types of contracts became more common: personal temporary contracts (between an individual worker and his employer), and contracts between a labor-contractor and employees who are employed in a triangular mode of employment (employee-contractor-client). The latter involves precarious employment and is more common among the more vulnerable sub-populations of new-immigrants, disabled individuals, Israeli-Arabs, foreign-workers and women. The contractual changes resulted in work instability, growth of the secondary labor market and segmentation. Efforts to protect the disadvantaged secondary labor-market workers include legislation, reforms, new regulations, and enforcement of all the above.
    Keywords: collective bargaining; contracted labor; foreign workers; immigrants; Israel; labor contracts; labor market segmenting; regulation
    JEL: J15 J21 J31 J41 J51 J58 J61 J81
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10734&r=lab
  3. By: Angela Parenti; Cristina Tealdi
    Abstract: In this paper we study how the determinants of regional commuting in Italy have evolved in the past fifteen years. Using labour force data from 1992 to 2008 we estimate a model where the probability of commuting is regressed on a wide set of individual, job, firm and regional characteristics. Specifically, we focus on understanding how the increased flexibility of the labour market in the late nineties/early twenties have affected the individual decision to commute across regions. Consistent with the previous literature, we identify specific types of individual working in firms with well-defined features who are more keen to commute. However, even though temporary employ-ees tend to commute more than permanent employees, the increased utilization of temporary contracts did not have a strong impact on the commuting decisions of Italian workers.
    Keywords: Migration, Labour Mobility, Labour Flexibility, Italian regions
    JEL: C25 J41 J61 R23
    Date: 2015–07–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2015/203&r=lab
  4. By: Bruce D. Meyer; Wallace K.C. Mok; James X. Sullivan
    Abstract: Household surveys, one of the main innovations in social science research of the last century, are threatened by declining accuracy due to reduced cooperation of respondents. While many indicators of survey quality have steadily declined in recent decades, the literature has largely emphasized rising nonresponse rates rather than other potentially more important dimensions to the problem. We divide the problem into rising rates of nonresponse, imputation, and measurement error, documenting the rise in each of these threats to survey quality over the past three decades. A fundamental problem in assessing biases due to these problems in surveys is the lack of a benchmark or measure of truth, leading us to focus on the accuracy of the reporting of government transfers. We provide evidence from aggregate measures of transfer reporting as well as linked microdata. We discuss the relative importance of misreporting of program receipt and conditional amounts of benefits received, as well as some of the conjectured reasons for declining cooperation and survey errors. We end by discussing ways to reduce the impact of the problem including the increased use of administrative data and the possibilities for combining administrative and survey data.
    JEL: C42 C81 D31 H53 H55 I32 I38
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21399&r=lab
  5. By: Effrosyni Adamopoulou (Bank of Italy); Roberta Zizza (Bank of Italy)
    Abstract: In this paper we use information on monthly wage increases set by collective agreements in Italy and exploit their variation across sectors and over time in order to examine how household consumption responds to different types of positive income shocks (regular tranches versus lump-sum payments). Focusing on single-earner households, we find that the Permanent-Income Hypothesis holds empirically, since total and food consumption do not exhibit excess sensitivity to anticipated income shocks. Consumption does not respond at the date of the announcement of income increases either, as these are known to compensate workers for the overall loss in their wages’ purchasing power. We also find, in line with the Permanent-Income Hypothesis, that consumption responds, but only a little, to transitory and less anticipated shocks, as the expenditures on clothing & shoes increase upon the receipt of the lump-sum payments. This finding can be interpreted as a "signaling-by-consuming" behaviour given that these goods represent conspicuous consumption. There is also some weak evidence of the existence of liquidity constraints regarding expenditures on strictly durables.
    Keywords: union contracts, consumption, permanent income hypothesis
    JEL: D12 E21 J51
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1024_15&r=lab
  6. By: Andrej Angelowski; Jordi Brandts; Carles Solà
    Abstract: In many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from four different treatments. For all four treatments we find escalation bias by managers. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. For three treatments we find that managers’ and employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired.
    Keywords: escalation bias, hiring, performance evaluations, experiments
    JEL: C92 D83 J63
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:839&r=lab
  7. By: Asako Ohinata; Matteo Picchio
    Abstract: We analyse how the financial support for long-term elderly care affects the level of household savings. Using a difference-in-differences estimator, we investigate the 2002 Scottish reform, which introduced free formal personal care for all the elderly aged 65 and above residing in Scotland. Our semiparametric estimation technique allows the policy effects to be flexibly estimated across age groups. We find that the Scottish policy reduced the average household saving by about £7,200. Moreover, the estimated effects are heterogeneous across age groups of the head of household: these effects are particularly strong among those aged between 40 and 60. The largest effect is observed at age 49 with the reduction in the average household saving by £12,764.
    Keywords: Long-term elderly care; ageing; means tested financial support; saving; wealth; difference-in-differences.
    JEL: C21 D14 I18 J14
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:15/17&r=lab

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