nep-lab New Economics Papers
on Labour Economics
Issue of 2013‒12‒20
seven papers chosen by
Erik Jonasson
National Institute of Economic Research

  1. Labour Market Developments and Social Welfare By Hermine Vidovic
  2. How selective are real wage cuts? A micro-analysis using linked employer-employee data By Hirsch, Boris; Zwick, Thomas
  3. The Costs of Recruiting Apprentices: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data By Samuel Muehlemann; Harald Pfeifer; Felix Wenzelmann
  4. Childcare Availability and Female Labor Force Participation: An Empirical Examination of the Chile Crece Contigo Program By James Manley; Felipe Vasquez
  5. Selection upon Wage Posting By Silvio Sticher
  6. Does Household Debt Influence the Labor Supply and Benefit Claiming Decisions of Older Americans? By Barbara A. Butrica; Nadia S. Karamcheva
  7. Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation By D. Dragone; F. Galeotti; R. Orsini

  1. By: Hermine Vidovic (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw)
    Abstract: Summary Employment and activity rates in the new EU Member States (NMS) declined significantly up to the early 2000s and started to increase along with strong GDP growth thereafter. Job losses following the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis varied substantially across countries and have not been offset yet. Overall, the low-educated and the young people are very disadvantaged on the NMS labour markets. With the exception of Poland and Slovenia, non-standard types of employment are uncommon in the NMS, following the pattern of Southern EU countries. Employment protection legislation has been adjusted to ‘European standards’ in the entire region. Union density and consequently the impact of trade unions on wage setting and employment in the NMS fell dramatically. In all NMS unemployment insurance schemes as well as minimum wage regulations were introduced at the beginning of the 1990s, but are less generous than in the EU-15.
    Keywords: labour market, labour market institutions
    JEL: J21 J52 J60 J64 J65 K31
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rpaper:rr:392&r=lab
  2. By: Hirsch, Boris; Zwick, Thomas
    Abstract: Using linked employer-employee panel data for Germany, this paper investigates whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider-outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective wage cuts with high-productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent differences in firms' wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council. -- Unter Verwendung verknüpfter Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Paneldaten für Deutschland untersucht diese Studie, ob Reallohnkürzungen selektiv vorgenommen werden. Im Einklang mit der Insider-Outsider-Theorie und mehreren Varianten der Effizienzlohntheorie finden wir deutliche Hinweise auf selektive Lohnreduktionen zugunsten hochproduktiver Arbeitnehmer, selbst wenn für unbeobachtete permanente Unterschiede in den Lohnpolitiken der Firmen kontrolliert wird. Im Widerspruch zu jüngeren Arbeiten, die Fairnessüberlegungen ins Zentrum stellen, finden wir zudem, dass selektive Lohnkürzungen die Lohndispersion innerhalb von Peergruppen erhöhen. Bemerkenswerterweise zeigen sich die gleichen Selektivitätsmuster auch für die Subgruppen tarifgebundener Firmen und solcher mit einem Betriebsrat.
    Keywords: real wage rigidity,real wage cuts,selectivity,Germany
    JEL: J30 J31
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:faulre:88&r=lab
  3. By: Samuel Muehlemann (University of Bern & IZA Bonn); Harald Pfeifer (Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) Bonn & Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) Maastricht); Felix Wenzelmann (Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) Bonn)
    Abstract: In this paper, we use firm-level data to analyse a firmÕs costs of recruiting apprentices in Germany. We find that recruitment costs amount on average to 600 Euros per hire (approximately one month of apprentice pay), but costs are heterogenous across firms and vary strongly with the training occupation. Our results suggest that shortages in the local supply of apprentices and a high degree of competition among training firms in the region increase recruitment costs. Furthermore, we find that firms with a works council or an investment-oriented training strategy incur higher recruitment costs. Finally, marginal recruitment costs first increase but eventually decrease for firms hiring a large number of apprentices. Our results are important in light of the increasing firm competition for talented school leavers induced by demographic change.
    Keywords: Recruitment costs, apprenticeship training, human capital investment, local labour markets, local training markets, demographic change
    JEL: J24 J32 J63 M53
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:educat:0095&r=lab
  4. By: James Manley (Department of Economics, Towson University); Felipe Vasquez (School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo)
    Abstract: Few works have examined the relationship between maternal participation in the labor force and the availability of child care in developing countries. Existing papers also tend to rely on relatively simplistic, correlative analysis of the data rather than modeling the joint decision to invest in formal childcare and to choose a level of labor supply. This paper takes advantage of a policy-induced positive shock in the provision of child care to apply instrumental variables in a simultaneous equations context, resulting in estimates that are more rigorous than any currently available in a developing country context. Policymakers are able to optimize their policy choices if they have better information on the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the cost of child care, and we find no evidence that the program is associated with an increase in women's labor supply.
    Keywords: Female Labor Supply, Child Care, Labor Force, Chile, CASEN, JUNJI.
    JEL: J13 J22 O12 H42
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tow:wpaper:2013-03&r=lab
  5. By: Silvio Sticher
    Abstract: We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.
    Keywords: directed search; selection; wage posting
    JEL: D83 J21 J31
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1311&r=lab
  6. By: Barbara A. Butrica; Nadia S. Karamcheva
    Abstract: Americans’ indebtedness has increased dramatically since the 1980s – a trend likely to have important implications for retirement security. This study finds that older adults with debt are 8 percentage points more likely to work and 2 percentage points less likely to receive Social Security benefits than those without debt. Not only does the presence of debt influence older adults’ behavior, but so do the amount and type of debt – particularly outstanding mortgages. Increasingly, retirement security will depend on having enough income and assets to pay for basic living expenses and to service debt.
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:crrwps:wp2013-22&r=lab
  7. By: D. Dragone; F. Galeotti; R. Orsini
    Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers.
    JEL: C72 C93 D23 H41 J54
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp915&r=lab

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