nep-knm New Economics Papers
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy
Issue of 2023‒06‒19
five papers chosen by
Laura Nicola-Gavrila
Centrul European de Studii Manageriale în Administrarea Afacerilor

  1. Testing an extended knowledge-capital model of foreign direct investment By Kox, Henk L.M.
  2. Economic Intelligence, Quésaco? By Leila Zemmouchi-Ghomari
  3. Intangible resources and cross-border acquisition decisions: The impact of reputation and the moderating effect of experiential knowledge By Olivier Lamotte; Ludivine Chalençon; Ulrike Mayrhofer; Ana Colovic
  4. Group knowledge and individual introspection By Michele Crescenzi
  5. Artificial intelligence moral agent as Adam Smith's impartial spectator By Nikodem Tomczak

  1. By: Kox, Henk L.M.
    Abstract: The knowledge-capital model of foreign direct investment implies that countries with relatively large outward FDI stocks should also have a relative abundance of proprietary knowledge assets. Early versions of the knowledge-capital theory model these assets as if they were only the results of knowledge investments by private firms. We extend the theory by modelling the public-private interaction in knowledge development. This sheds light on the role of the origin country of multinationals. The paper extracts four testable predictions from the model. We to use the inter-country variation in national knowledge-creation systems and foreign-investment performance to test the model. After developing a new dataset that holds knowledge-creation indicators for about 200 countries over the period 2000-2020, we apply a range of non-parametric tests to test the model predictions. Our findings confirm the basic tenet of the knowledge-capital model and show the important role of public knowledge production for outward FDI.
    Keywords: business innovation; public knowledge creation; foreign direct investment; knowledge capital; empirical test; worldwide scope
    JEL: D21 D83 F23 O31 O34
    Date: 2023–05–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:117266&r=knm
  2. By: Leila Zemmouchi-Ghomari (ENSTA - Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Technologies Avancées)
    Abstract: Economic Intelligence (EI) is a strategic information management discipline based on knowing and anticipating environmental changes, protecting and preserving strategic information against competitor attacks, and utilizing the produced knowledge to develop environmental improvements. As such, it facilitates the implementation of strategic actions by enabling companies to anticipate threats and opportunities and be reactive. Despite its importance, EI is often misunderstood, confused with business intelligence and knowledge management, and hence, underexploited. This paper aims to describe it to participate in its dissemination to a broader use than it is currently.
    Abstract: L'intelligence économique (IE) est une discipline de gestion de l'information stratégique basée sur la connaissance et l'anticipation des changements environnementaux, la protection et la préservation de l'information stratégique contre les attaques des concurrents, et l'utilisation des connaissances produites pour développer des améliorations environnementales. En tant que telle, elle facilite la mise en œuvre d'actions stratégiques en permettant aux entreprises d'anticiper les menaces et les opportunités et d'être réactives. Malgré son importance, l'IE est souvent mal comprise, confondue avec l'intelligence économique et la gestion des connaissances, et donc sous-exploitée. Ce document vise à la décrire afin de participer à sa diffusion vers une utilisation plus large qu'elle ne l'est actuellement. Traduit avec www.DeepL.com/Translator (version gratuite)
    Keywords: Competitive Intelligence, Strategic Management, Technology Management, Influence, Protection, Watch
    Date: 2023–04–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04078590&r=knm
  3. By: Olivier Lamotte (Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie); Ludivine Chalençon (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon); Ulrike Mayrhofer (GRM - Groupe de Recherche en Management - EA 4711 - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Ana Colovic (NEOMA - Neoma Business School)
    Abstract: Drawing from the resource-based view, signaling theory, and internationalization literatures, we argue that a key intangible resource – reputation – influences the decision to engage in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Reputation facilitates foreign market entry by reducing the risks and costs inherent in such strategic moves, while acting to curb potentially risky decisions. Based on a longitudinal sample of 869 acquisitions conducted by European and US firms, our study confirms the inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's reputation and the likelihood of undertaking CBAs. We also find that international experiential knowledge moderates the relationship between reputation and the likelihood of additional CBAs. Our research contributes to the growing literature on the influence of intangible strategic resources, especially that of reputation, on foreign market entry strategies.
    Keywords: Cross-border acquisitions, information asymmetry, signal, reputation, international experiential knowledge
    Date: 2021–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03207403&r=knm
  4. By: Michele Crescenzi
    Abstract: I study distributed knowledge, which is what a group of privately informed agents can possibly know if they communicate freely with one another. Contrary to the extant literature, I study differently introspective agents. Three categories of agents are considered: non-introspective, positively introspective, and fully introspective. When a non-introspective agent knows something, she may fail to know that she knows it. On the contrary, when a fully introspective agent knows something, she always knows that she knows it. A fully introspective agent is positively introspective and, when she does not know something, she also knows that she does not know it. I give two equivalent characterizations of distributed knowledge: one in terms of knowledge operators and the other in terms of possibility relations, i.e., binary relations. I study distributed knowledge by modelling explicitly the communication and inference making process behind it. I show that there are two significantly different cases to consider. In the first, distributed knowledge is driven by the group member who is sophisticated enough to replicate all the inferences that anyone else in the group can make. In the second case, no member is sophisticated enough to replicate what anyone else in the group can infer. As a result, distributed knowledge is determined by a two-person subgroup who can jointly replicate what others infer. The latter case depicts a wisdom-of-the-crowd effect, in which the group knows more than what any of its members could possibly know by having access to all the information available within the group.
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2305.08729&r=knm
  5. By: Nikodem Tomczak
    Abstract: Adam Smith developed a version of moral philosophy where better decisions are made by interrogating an impartial spectator within us. We discuss the possibility of using an external non-human-based substitute tool that would augment our internal mental processes and play the role of the impartial spectator. Such tool would have more knowledge about the world, be more impartial, and would provide a more encompassing perspective on moral assessment.
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2305.11519&r=knm

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