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on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy |
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Issue of 2021‒03‒22
three papers chosen by Laura Ştefănescu Centrul European de Studii Manageriale în Administrarea Afacerilor |
| By: | Emile Cammeraat (OECD); Lea Samek (OECD); Mariagrazia Squicciarini (OECD) |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds light on the relationship between innovation, human capital endowment and upgrading, organisational capital (OC) and labour productivity. In addition to assessing correlations, it uses a Heckman selection model to address causal links and to account for the ways in which skills and investment in R&D affect the probability of innovating. The analysis finds that innovative output, the proportion of OC-related workers, investment in training (especially in informal training) and physical capital intensity are positively and significantly related to productivity. In most estimates ICT skills, cognitive skills and the presence of highly skilled workers in an industry also emerge as having a significant and positive relationship with productivity. ICT skills further appear to indirectly shape productivity, through a positive relationship with innovation. |
| Keywords: | Human Capital, ICT, Innovation, Labour Productivity, Organisational Capital, Patent, R&D, Skills, STEM, Training |
| Date: | 2021–03–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaac:103-en&r=all |
| By: | Chila, Vilma (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a1f5d18c-783b-4af6-8414-61a224f6a525&r=all |
| By: | Lach, Saul; Neeman, Zvika; Schankerman, Mark |
| Abstract: | We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing, and a second with a lower interest plus co-financing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, cost of public funds, and effectiveness of the private VC industry. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism design; Innovation; R&D; Entrepreneurship; Additionality; Government finance; Venture capital |
| JEL: | E6 F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2020–08–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:105873&r=all |