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on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy |
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Issue of 2017‒08‒13
four papers chosen by Laura Ştefănescu Centrul European de Studii Manageriale în Administrarea Afacerilor |
| By: | Amavilah, Voxi; Asongu, Simplice; Andrés, Antonio |
| Abstract: | We argue that there exists an indirect link between globalization and the knowledge economy of African countries in which globalization influences ‘peace and stability’ and peace and stability affects governance, and through governance the knowledge economy. We model the link as a three-stage process in four testable hypotheses, which permits an empirical analysis without sacrificing economic relevance for statistical significance. The results indicate that the impacts on governance of peace and stability from globalization defined as trade are stronger than those of peace and stability resulting from globalization taken to be foreign direct investment. We conclude that foreign direct investment is not a powerful mechanism for stimulating and sustaining the African knowledge. However, since the effects of globalization on peace and stability can influence governance both positively and negatively, we also conclude that the prospect for the knowledge economy in African countries may be realistic and attainable, as long as these countries continue to engage in the kind of globalization that enhances peace and stability. |
| Keywords: | Globalization; peace and stability; Governance; knowledge economy, African countries |
| JEL: | I20 I28 K42 O10 O55 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80651&r=knm |
| By: | Mabrouki, Mohamed |
| Abstract: | By granting protection rights, the society provides an incentive for economic agents to invest more in research and development. The patent is also likely to encourage the production of innovations and ensure the dissemination of knowledge, which promotes economic growth. This work aims to analyze the situation of patent protection in the framework of the Tunisian economy. |
| Keywords: | Industrial property, Patent, Innovation, research and development, Tunisia |
| JEL: | O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80696&r=knm |
| By: | Christian Fons-Rosen; Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan; Bent E. Sorensen; Carolina Villegas-Sanchez; Vadym Volosovych |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on total factor productivity (TFP) of domestic firms using a new, representative firm-level data set spanning six countries. A novel finding is that firm-level spillovers from foreign firms to domestic companies can be significantly positive, non-existent, or even negative, depending on which sectors receive FDI. When foreign firms produce in the same narrow sector as domestic firms, the latter are negatively affected by increasing competition and positively affected by knowledge spillovers. We find that the positive spillovers dominate if foreign firms enter sectors where firms are “technologically close,” controlling for the endogeneity of their entry decision into such sectors. Positive technology spillovers also affect firms in other sectors, if those sectors are technologically close to the sectors receiving FDI. Increasing FDI in sectors that are technologically close to other sectors boosts TFP of domestic firms by twice as much as increasing FDI by the same amount across all sectors. |
| JEL: | E32 F15 F36 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23643&r=knm |
| By: | Lach, Saul; Neeman, Zvika; Schankerman, Mark |
| Abstract: | We study the design of a government loan program for risky R&D projects that generate positive externalities, undertaken by entrepreneurs in a competitive capital market environment. With adverse selection, the optimal contract requires a high interest rate but nearly zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed policies, typified by a low interest rate and high co-finanacing requirement. When we add moral hazard (endogenous success), the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest/zero self-finanacing and a second with a lower interest but also a co-finanacing requirement. Calibrated simulations compare the optimal policy and observed program designs in terms of innovation and welfare. |
| Keywords: | additionality; entrepreneurship; government nance; innovation; mechanism design; R&D; start-ups |
| JEL: | D61 D82 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12199&r=knm |