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on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy |
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Issue of 2015‒07‒18
two papers chosen by Laura Ştefănescu Centrul European de Studii Manageriale în Administrarea Afacerilor |
| By: | Marcos Valdivia López |
| Abstract: | This study proposes a spatial interaction model to analyze the level of creativity across Metro Areas (MAs) in a country. The model postulates that increasing creativity depends on the proportions of common knowledge and differential knowledge that MAs face when they interact with each other. We rely on an agent-based approach that allows incorporating GIS and spatial interaction between MAs under local and global network conditions. We chose the cases of Mexico and Spain to get a first glance of how the model works with real data. We find that the MAs of Spain (2001) and Mexico (2003) share the same level of common and differential knowledge in the creative industries and, that knowledge spillovers spread better under inter metropolitan conditions of interaction instead of intra ones. The simulations suggest that Spain is better suited to produce higher knowledge externalities under conditions that are not restricted by physical distance, which make policy intervention in Spain more effective to diffuse creative ideas. |
| Keywords: | Externalities, knowledge spillovers, creative industries, urban spatial models, computational modeling. |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uae:wpaper:0815&r=knm |
| By: | Kunte, Sebastian; Wollni, Meike |
| Abstract: | Contract flexibility can be expedient for economic exchange in environments with high ambiguity and risk, but may also encourage opportunistic behavior. We run a modified investment game, including the choice between two different contract designs and asymmetric information about the realized surplus (i.e., hidden knowledge). We examine if Nairobi slum dwellers choose flexible over rigid contracts when interacting in risky environments and whether preferences for contract flexibility are sensitive to the exogenous probability of experiencing a negative shock. We find that most interaction is realized through flexible agreements. Principals offer a higher level of flexibility if the likelihood of a shock is high, relative to the low-risk environment. Agents are somewhat more reluctant to sign rigid agreements when facing the threat of a bad state. While agents and the overall efficiency benefit from higher flexibility, principals always do better by opting for a rigid contract. |
| Keywords: | contract flexibility, risk sharing, hidden knowledge, artefactual field experiment, investment game, Nairobi slums, Kenya, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Risk and Uncertainty, C72, D82, L14, O12, |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:gagfdp:205914&r=knm |