nep-knm New Economics Papers
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy
Issue of 2013‒05‒05
five papers chosen by
Laura Stefanescu
European Research Centre of Managerial Studies in Business Administration

  1. Individual roles to achieve knowledge integration in Mergers and Acquisitions: Completing the Knowledge Broker concept with Knowledge Developer's roles By Elvira Périac; Sébastien Gand; Jean-Claude Sardas
  2. Innovation and growth with financial, and other, frictions By Jonathan Chiu; Cesaire Meh; Randall Wright
  3. Innovation, employment growth, and foreign ownership of firms: A European perspective By Dachs, Bernhard; Peters, Bettina
  4. Innovation, Reallocation and Growth By Daron Acemoglu; Ufuk Akcigit; Nicholas Bloom; William R. Kerr
  5. The Choice of Innovation Policy Instruments By Borrás, Susana; Edquist, Charles

  1. By: Elvira Périac (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Sébastien Gand (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Jean-Claude Sardas (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris)
    Abstract: Among researches on knowledge issues in M&As, there has been a stream underlining the importance of knowledge integration process (i.e process of transfer or combination - within or between firms -, resulting in the production of a new/renewed form of knowledge) in post merger phases. In these researches, Knowledge integration appears as a key issue for the success of M&As. Our paper aims at contributing to understand knowledge integration processes in M&As, and more precisely, the way specific individual roles intervene in these processes: their action, their abilities and their specificities. Based on an empirical study of a merger between 3 French public administrations, we propose a framework to analyze individual roles in knowledge integration processes in M&As. Based on the concept of Knowledge Broker, we specify the existing view by proposing two sub-categories of individual roles: first, Knowledge Mediators who achieve knowledge integration both by mediating knowledge between actors to lead them to produce new/renewed knowledge and by producing a new/renewed knowledge themselves; second, Knowledge Developers who achieve knowledge integration by combining themselves several areas of knowledge to produce a new/renewed knowledge out of any action of mediation between actors or specific position in a network. Such a framework contributes to a better understanding of two issues for knowledge integration in M&As literature: the importance of the human factor and the diversity of the mechanisms to achieve knowledge integration.
    Keywords: Merger, Knowledge integration, knowledge broker, public administration
    Date: 2012–07–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00818093&r=knm
  2. By: Jonathan Chiu; Cesaire Meh; Randall Wright
    Abstract: The generation and implementation of ideas, or knowledge, is crucial for economic performance. We study this process in a model of endogenous growth with frictions. Productivity increases with knowledge, which advances via innovation, and with the exchange of ideas from those who generate them to those best able to implement them (technology transfer). But frictions in this market—including search, bargaining, and commitment problems—impede exchange and thus slow growth. We characterize optimal policies to subsidize research and trade in ideas, given both knowledge and search externalities. We discuss the roles of liquidity and financial institutions, and show two ways in which intermediation can enhance efficiency and innovation. First, intermediation allows us to finance more transactions with fewer assets. Second, it ameliorates certain bargaining problems, by allowing entrepreneurs to undo otherwise sunk investments in liquidity. We also discuss some evidence suggesting that technology transfer is a significant source of innovation and showing how it is affected by credit considerations.
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedacq:2013-01&r=knm
  3. By: Dachs, Bernhard; Peters, Bettina
    Abstract: This paper examines how foreign-owned and domestically owned firms transform innovation into employment growth. The empirical analysis, based on the model of Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse and Peters (2008) and CIS data for 16 countries, reveals important differences between the two groups: Due to general productivity increases and process innovation, foreign-owned firms experience higher job losses than domestically owned firms. At the same time, employment- creating effects of product innovation are larger for foreignowned firms. Together with employment-stimulating effects stemming from existing products, they overcompensate the negative displacement effects resulting in net employment growth in foreign-owned firms. However, net employment growth turns out to be smaller in foreign-owned firms than in domestically owned firms. --
    Keywords: employment,innovation,foreign ownership,Community Innovation Survey,host country effects
    JEL: O31 O33 F23
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13019&r=knm
  4. By: Daron Acemoglu; Ufuk Akcigit; Nicholas Bloom; William R. Kerr
    Abstract: We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using detailed US Census micro data on firm-level output, R&D and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output and R&D, and its implied elasticities are in the ballpark of a range of micro estimates. We find industrial policy subsidizing either the R&D or the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth and welfare. For example, a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 5% of GDP reduces welfare by about 1.5% because it deters entry of new high-type firms. On the contrary, substantial improvements (of the order of 5% improvement in welfare) are possible if the continued operation of incumbents is taxed while at the same time R&D by incumbents and new entrants is subsidized. This is because of a strong selection effect: R&D resources (skilled labor) are inefficiently used by low-type incumbent firms. Subsidies to incumbents encourage the survival and expansion of these firms at the expense of potential high-type entrants. We show that optimal policy encourages the exit of low-type firms and supports R&D by high-type incumbents and entry.
    JEL: E02 L1 O31 O32 O33
    Date: 2013–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18993&r=knm
  5. By: Borrás, Susana (Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark CIRCLE, Lund University, Sweden); Edquist, Charles (CIRCLE, Lund University)
    Abstract: The purpose of this article is to discuss the different types of instruments of innovation policy, to examine how governments and public agencies in different countries and different times have used these instruments differently, to explore the political nature of instrument choice and design (and associated issues), and to elaborate a set of criteria for the selection and design of the instruments in relation to the formulation of innovation policy. The article argues that innovation policy instruments must be designed and combined into mixes in ways that address the problems of the innovation system. These mixes are often called “policy mix”. The problem-oriented nature of the design of instrument mixes is what makes innovation policy instruments ‘systemic’
    Keywords: Policy mix; innovation system; innovation policy instruments; governance; regulation; public policy
    JEL: O30 O31 O32 O33 O38
    Date: 2013–02–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2013_004&r=knm

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