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on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy |
| By: | Å. Gornitzka, P. Maassen, J. P. Olsen,; B. Stensaker |
| Keywords: | Europeanization; Europeanization; knowledge; institutionalism; institutionalisation; political science; integration theory |
| Date: | 2007–02–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:arenax:p0245&r=knm |
| By: | George Evans; Seppo Honkapohja; Kaushik Mitra |
| Abstract: | We consider the impact of anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations. To model this we assume that agents combine limited structural knowledge with a standard adaptive learning rule. We analyze these issues using two well-known set-ups, an endowment economy and the Ramsey model. In our set-up there are important deviations from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning. Our approach could be applied to many macroeconomic frameworks. |
| Keywords: | Taxation, expectations, Ramsey model. |
| JEL: | E62 D84 E21 E43 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:cdmawp:0717&r=knm |
| By: | Jung, Hanjoon Michael |
| Abstract: | We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence receivers. We show that if there is only one sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination situation without information about their opponents' types, the sender could influence the receivers to make decisions according to the sender's primary preference by manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the sender's primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of multiple senders, however, when there is enough media competition or when simultaneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored outcome against senders' preferences, which sheds light on a solution to the media manipulation problem. |
| Keywords: | Arms Race; Common Knowledge; Information Transmission; Media Bias; Media Competition; Media Manipulation. |
| JEL: | D83 D82 C72 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5473&r=knm |
| By: | Meyer, Jenny |
| Abstract: | For the first time data of German ICT and knowledge intensive service providers are used to analyze the relation between the age structure of the workforce and the probability of adopting new technologies. The results show that firms with a higher share of younger employees are more likely to adopt new technologies and the older the workforce the less likely is the adoption of new technologies. Furthermore the results exhibit that the age structure of the workforce should be accompanied by appropriate workplace organization. A part of the firms which enhanced teamwork or flattened their hierarchies are actually more likely to adopt new technologies and software when they have a higher share of older employees whereas they are less likely to introduce new technologies if they have a higher share of younger employees. |
| Keywords: | age structure of the workforce, adoption of new technologies, ICT intensive services |
| JEL: | J14 O31 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:6353&r=knm |
| By: | Valentin Kvist, Ann (Göteborg University); Gustafsson, Jan-Eric (Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | According to Cattell’s (1987) Investment theory individual differences in acquisition of knowledge and skills are partly the result of investment of Fluid Intelligence (Gf) in learning situations demanding insights in complex relations. If this theory holds true Gf will be a factor of General Intelligence (g) because it is involved in all domains of learning. The purpose of the current study was to test the Investment theory, through investigating effects on the relation between Gf and g of differential learning opportunities for different subsets of a population. A second-order model was fitted with confirmatory factor analysis to a battery of 17 tests hypothesized to measure four broad cognitive abilities The model was estimated for three groups with different learning opportunities (N = 2358 Swedes, N = 620 European immigrants, N = 591 non-European immigrants), as well as for the total group. For this group the g Gf relationship was 0.83, while it was close to unity within each of the three subgroups. These results support the Investment theory. |
| Keywords: | Structure of intelligence; Cattell’s Investment theory; fluid Intelligence; general Intelligence |
| JEL: | J24 J61 |
| Date: | 2007–06–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2007_023&r=knm |
| By: | Nicolas van Zeebroeck (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels.) |
| Abstract: | The length of patent rights is an issue of considerable importance in the design of patent systems, and its optimality has been intensively discussed in the literature. This dimension – taking the form of the number of years during which a given patent has been maintained – has been considered in the empirical literature as a direct indication of the private value of patents. But the lack of comprehensive data on both the renewal of patents and their characteristics has prevented so far any systematic analysis of the determinants of this duration. Relying on a comprehensive dataset including detailed information on all patent applications filed to the European Patent Office from 1980 to 2000 and on the renewal of those of them that were granted, this paper presents a survival time analysis of the determinants of patent length in Europe. The results are threefold: first, they clearly establish that patent rights have significantly increased in length over the past decades despite a small decline in the average grant rate, and due to the dilatation of the examination process and higher maintenance rates. Second, they show that some filing strategies induce considerable delays in the examination process, possibly to the benefits of the patentee, but most certainly to the expense of legal uncertainty on the markets and undue exploitation of the provisional protection granted to pending applications by the European Patent Convention. And third, they confirm that more valuable patents (more cited or covering a larger geographical scope) take more time to be processed and live longer, whereas more complex applications are associated with longer decision lags but also with lower grant and renewal rates. These results have many policy implications for technology markets, patent systems and all their stakeholders. |
| Keywords: | Patent length, Patent value, Renewals, Granting Process, Survival Time Analysis |
| JEL: | O31 O34 O50 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:07-028&r=knm |