nep-knm New Economics Papers
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy
Issue of 2006‒10‒14
nine papers chosen by
Emanuele Canegrati
London School of Economics and Political Science

  1. An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning By Drew Fudenberg; David K Levine
  2. Evolutionary Economics and Psychology By Ulrich Witt
  3. Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation By Iyer, Karthik; Huhns, Michael
  4. Learning to Destroy By Per Hogselius
  5. Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees By Elisabeth Schulte
  6. Dynamic Analysis of Innovation and International Transfer of Technology through Licensing By Hitoshi Tanaka; Tatsuro Iwaisako; Koichi Futagami
  7. Influence of Advertising Variability, Brand Extension Effects, Brand Name, Variety Seeking Behavior and Customer Value on Buying Decisions: A Multi-experiment Analysis By Rajagopal
  8. Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Innovations By Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
  9. Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments By Lise Vesterlund; Laurent Muller; Martin Sefton; Richard Steinberg

  1. By: Drew Fudenberg; David K Levine
    Date: 2006–10–05
  2. By: Ulrich Witt
    Abstract: Evolutionary economics is a paradigm for explaining the transformation of the economy. To achieve its goal, it needs being founded on a proper theory of economic behavior. The paper discusses these foundations. It is argued that the historical malleability of economic behavior is based on the interactions between innate behavior dispositions and adaptation mechanisms on the one hand and the limited, and always selective, cognitive and observational learning that contributes to an ever more extended and differentiated action knowledge. The implications of this interpretation are outlined in an exemplary fashion for the case of the evolution and growth of consumption. Length 29 pages
    Date: 2006–10
  3. By: Iyer, Karthik; Huhns, Michael
    Abstract: This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of the resource among n agents in a fair manner. The protocol enables agents to choose portions based on their internal utility function, which they do not have to reveal. In addition to being fair, the protocol has desirable features such as being unbiased and verifiable while allocating resources. In the case where the resource is two-dimensional (a circular cake) and uniform, it is shown that each agent can get close to l/n of the whole resource.
    Keywords: Utility theory ; Utility function ; Bargaining ; Artificial intelligence ; Resource allocation ; Multiagent system
    JEL: F51 J52 C78
    Date: 2005–10
  4. By: Per Hogselius
    Abstract: This paper investigates the process of creative destruction and creative destuction management in the Baltic Sea region through a series of case studies of conrete technologies that both Eastern and Western countries in the region have tried to get rid of during the past decade or so. The cases are: old-style banking technologies, old-generation nuclear power, copper-wire telephone lines and fossil-fuel energy production. It is shown that it in general it has been extremely difficult for countries to creatively destroy these outdated technologies, but that it is also possible to point at a number of success stories. The paper identifies several factors underlying successful creative destruction in the Baltic Sea region, concluding that these factors differ between Eastern and Western countries. It also discusses the ways in which the corresponding processes have - and have not - been actively managed at the political level.
    Date: 2006–09
  5. By: Elisabeth Schulte (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim)
    Abstract: This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. In a first stage, agents may exchange private (decision-relevant) information which is assumed to be verifiable. Then they reach a decision via majority voting. We study different information environments and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.
    Keywords: Information aggregation, committee decisions, preference heterogeneity
    JEL: D72 D78 D82
    Date: 2006–10
  6. By: Hitoshi Tanaka (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University); Tatsuro Iwaisako (Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University); Koichi Futagami (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
    Abstract: This paper develops a quality-ladder type dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous innovation and technology licensing as a major source of international technology transfer in developing countries. Examining the dynamic characteristics of the model fully, we explore the short- and long-run effects of both an improvement in the probability of reaching a licensing agreement with a given effort and an increase in the license fee rate. The model shows that the former promotes innovation and technology transfers in both the long and short run, while the latter discourages them.
    Keywords: Innovation; Licensing; Technology transfer
    JEL: F43 O33
    Date: 2006–02
  7. By: Rajagopal (Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México)
    Abstract: The belief that individual difference in brand preference or choice behavior are caused by personality differences has not always been supported by empirical research. The experiment on the variety seeking behavior of consumers, discussed in this paper argues that although consumers are seeking novelty and unexpectedness in a brand that they have not bought before, their purchase will be selective, in reference to the empirical investigation. The perceptions on brand name in reference to brand risk and brand differences have been the prime factors in making buying decision for new brands among the consumers. Consumers also ascertain the brand name associated with the unfamiliar brands as they feel high risk averse and entangle in decision making with perceived brand differences. The paper discusses the influence of advertising, brand name, variety seeking behavior and customer value towards making buying decisions. The study has been divided into four experiments carried out in reference to retail business environment in Mexico.
    Keywords: Advertising, media communication, brand extension, customer value, cognitive behavior, decision making
    JEL: D11 M31 M37
    Date: 2006–08
  8. By: Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
    Date: 2006–10–05
  9. By: Lise Vesterlund; Laurent Muller; Martin Sefton; Richard Steinberg
    Date: 2005–01

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