nep-knm New Economics Papers
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy
Issue of 2006‒10‒07
eight papers chosen by
Emanuele Canegrati
London School of Economics and Political Science

  1. Institutions and ICT Adoption By Kiessling, Johan
  2. What do you mean by "mobile"? Multi-applicant inventors in the European Bio-Technology Industry By Francesco Laforgia; Francesco Lissoni
  3. Reinforcing the patent system? Patent fencing, knowledge diffusion and welfare By Murat YILDIZOGLU (E3i-IFReDE-GRES)
  4. Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights By Sunil Kanwar
  5. Business Process Innovation using the Process Innovation Laboratory. By Møller, Charles
  6. Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and R&D Subsidy Policy By Cuihong Fan; Elmar Wolfstetter
  7. NETWORK SIZE AND NETWORK CAPTURE By Gerard Llobet; Michael Manove
  8. On R&D Information Sharing and Merger By Uday Bhanu Sinha

  1. By: Kiessling, Johan (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the global diffusion process for three ICT technologies: cellular telephony, Internet and personal computers to test the hypothesis that the difference between countries in institutional characteristics significantly affects the time to adoption of these technologies. The analysis shows that the quality of economic and financial institutions and, to a smaller degree political institutions, significantly affects the time to adoption of the studied ICT technologies. The institutional effects were not uniform during all stages of adoption and for all three technologies but the level effects were on average found to be of the same magnitude as those of education and GDP per capita. The results are robust also when controlled for a number of other possible determinants of productivity and growth as well as fixed country effects.
    Keywords: Barriers to technology adoption; Institutions; Technology diffusion
    JEL: O33
    Date: 2006–03–31
  2. By: Francesco Laforgia; Francesco Lissoni
    Abstract: Many recent papers dealing with the issue of knowledge spillovers have relied on patent data to extract information on so-called mobile inventors that is inventors designated by patent applications filed by different companies. In this paper we follow in this tradition, but with the aim of setting straight a number of methodological issues. By making use of information on the identity and history of those applicants, we then propose a taxonomy of the phenomena behind multi-applicant inventorship, which distinguishes between job mobility, mobility as a result of M&As, a case which we suspect to be dominated by the markets for research and for technologies, and residuals cases. We then argue that different multi-applicant inventors’ categories have to do with different patterns of knowledge diffusion, which include both spillovers and markets for technology.
    Keywords: Patents; mobile inventors; multi-applicant inventorship; knowledge diffusion
    JEL: O31 O32
    Date: 2006
    Abstract: This article develops an evolutionary model of industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. This model explicitly takes into account the potentially positive effects of the patents: Publication of patents participates to the building of a collective knowledge stock on which the innovations can rely, and dropped patents can provide a source of technological progress for firms that are lagging behind the leaders of the industry. These dimensions of the patent system are used to question the negative results of Vallée & Yildizoglu (2006). The main results of the new model show that these positive effects do not counterbalance the negative effects of a stronger patent system on social welfare and global technological progress, even if it is a source of better protection and higher profits for the firms.
    Keywords: Innovation, Technical progress, Patent system, Intellectual property rights (IPR), Technology policy, Technological regimes
    JEL: O3 O34 L52
    Date: 2006
  4. By: Sunil Kanwar (Delhi School of Economics)
    Abstract: Very little empirical evidence exists on the relationship between intellectual property rights and innovation. Existing studies tend to be indirect and do not consider the influence of IPRs on innovation per se; nor do they adequately allow for the endogeneity of IPRs. Correcting for these omissions, we show that the strength of intellectual property protection has a strong positive influence on innovation.
    Keywords: Innovation, IPRs, Endogeneity.
    JEL: O O
    Date: 2006–08
  5. By: Møller, Charles (Department of Management Science and Logistics, Aarhus School of Business)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a research program on Business Process Innovation: Towards Global Supply Chain Intelligence. Few words are more ubiquitous in business or society today than “innovation”. This reflects that businesses are striving for ways to survive and thrive in an increasingly complex and connected world (IBM 2006). <p> Most industrial supply chains today are globally scattered and nearly all organizations rely on their Enterprise Information Systems (ES) for integration and coordination of their activities. In this context innovation inevitably is driven by advanced information technology. <p> Organizations today are required not only to operate effective business processes but they also need to accommodate to changing business conditions at an increasing rate. Consequently the ability to develop and implement new processes driven by the Enterprise Information Systems is a central competence in most industries, and furthermore it is a critical practice for a global enterprise. <p> The next practice in Global Supply Chain Management is Business Process Innovation. Business Process Innovation is the transformation of a global supply chain driven by a new advanced Enterprise Information Systems technology. This technology holds the potential to “close the control loop”, but until now few organizations have managed to unleash the full potential of global supply chain intelligence. Thus, there is an emerging need for managing the transformation and for new approaches that will lead to robust global supply chains. <p> This paper presents a conceptual framework for Business Process Innovation. A research proposal based on five interrelated topics is derived from the framework. The research program is intended to establish and to develop the conceptual framework for business process innovation and to apply this framework in a global supply chain context. These topics are presented in the following sections, but first the background for the program is discussed.
    Keywords: No keywords;
    Date: 2006–07–24
  6. By: Cuihong Fan (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics, Guoding Road 777 200433 Shanghai, China.; Elmar Wolfstetter (Dept. of Economics, Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin,Germany.
    Abstract: We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms in order to raise their bargaining position in the joint venture. This holds true regardless of whether governments offer either unconditional or conditional subsidies. This suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies.
    Keywords: patent licensing, industrial organization, R&D subsidies, research joint ventures, technology policy
    JEL: L13 O34
    Date: 2006–09
  7. By: Gerard Llobet; Michael Manove (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)
    Abstract: Most types of networks, over time, spawn the creation of complementary stocks that enhance network value. Computer operating systems, for example, induce the development of the complementary stock of software applications that increase the value of the operating system. In this paper, we challenge the conventional wisdom that a large network, which induces the creation of large complementary stocks, serves as a barrier to entry that protects the incumbent from competition or network capture. We show that a larger network may either deter or attract entry depending on the relation between the network quality and the cost of an innovator's network product. The probability of entry also depends on the level of compatibility between the potential entrant's technology and existing complementary stocks, which in turn is influenced by the strength of the intellectual-property-rigths environment. Intellectual property rigths and the associated threat of entry may affect and incumbent's choice of network size in counterintuitive ways.
    JEL: L41 O34
    Date: 2006–04
  8. By: Uday Bhanu Sinha (Delhi School of Economics)
    Abstract: The paper deals with the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly by an innovating firm in the face of a merger with its rival. The innovating firm would share information about the cost realization with its rival provided the market size is relatively small or, the R&D technology is relatively more efficient in a medium market size. However, in a large market, or in a medium market size with less efficient R&D technology, the innovating firm does not share information with its rival. We also show that the social welfare may be higher under incomplete information regime.
    Keywords: Information sharing, market size, R&D, merger and welfare.
    JEL: L13 O32
    Date: 2006–08

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