nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2021‒03‒08
two papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. Sovereign default and imperfect tax enforcement By Francesco Pappadà; Yanos Zylberberg
  2. Offshore Tax Evasion and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from a Tax Amnesty in the Netherlands By Wouter Leenders; Arjan Lejour; Simon Rabaté; Maarten van’t Riet

  1. By: Francesco Pappadà (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France); Yanos Zylberberg (University of Bristol [Bristol], CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)
    Abstract: The effect of fiscal policy on default risk is mitigated by the response of tax compliance. To explore the consequences of this stylized fact, we build a model of sovereign debt with limited commitment and imperfect tax enforcement. Fiscal policy persistently affects the size of the informal economy, which impacts future fiscal revenues and default risk. The interaction of imperfect tax enforcement and limited commitment strongly constrains the dynamics of optimal fiscal policy and leads to costly uctuations in consumption.
    Keywords: Sovereign default,Imperfect tax enforcement,Fiscal policy
    Date: 2021–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03142208&r=all
  2. By: Wouter Leenders; Arjan Lejour; Simon Rabaté; Maarten van’t Riet
    Abstract: Exploiting unique datasets covering over 28,000 tax evaders in the Netherlands, we investigate the distribution of tax evasion and its implications for the measurement of wealth inequality. In contrast to Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019), the correction for offshore wealth has only a modest effect on top wealth shares. We show that the distributional pattern of tax evasion depends on the type of tax evasion, e.g. it depends on the offshore country of choice. We explore a number of explanations to account for the differences in results and caution against projecting distributional patterns of detected tax evasion onto still undetected evasion. We also study the dynamic compliance behaviour of tax amnesty participants and document large and sustained increases in reported wealth of around 60% following amnesty participation.Combined with evidence of only a modest increase in the adoption of tax avoidance strategies, this suggests that amnesty participation can lead to substantial public revenue gains.
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econwp:_52&r=all

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