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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Cullen, Julie Berry; Turner, Nicholas; Washington, Ebonya L |
| Keywords: | tax evasion, tax morale |
| Date: | 2018–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt3vr614rc&r=all |
| By: | Anders Jensen |
| Abstract: | This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model’s main predictions on the dynamics of evasion. |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cid:wpfacu:372&r=all |
| By: | Miloš Fišar (Vienna University of Economics and Business & Masaryk University); Tommaso Reggiani (Cardiff University, Masaryk University & IZA); Fabio Sabatini (Sapienza University of Rome & IZA); Jiří Špalek (Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of media bias on tax compliance. Through a framed laboratory experiment, we assess how the exposure to biased news about government action affects compliance in a repeated taxation game. Subjects treated with positive news are significantly more compliant than the control group. The exposure to negative news, instead, does not prompt any significant reaction in respect to the neutral condition, suggesting that participants perceive the media negativity bias in the selection and tonality of news as the norm rather than the exception. Overall, our results suggest that biased news act as a constant source of psychological priming and play a vital role in taxpayers' compliance decisions. |
| Keywords: | Tax compliance, media bias, taxation game, laboratory experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 D70 H26 H31 |
| Date: | 2020–01–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2020-01&r=all |
| By: | Julien Albertini (Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Xavier Fairise (GAINS, University of Le Mans); Anthony Terriau (GAINS, University of Le Mans) |
| Abstract: | How do labor market and health outcomes interact over the life cycle in a country characterized by a large informal sector and strong inequalities? To quantify the effects of bad health on labor market trajectories, wealth, and consumption, we develop a life-cycle heterogeneous agents model with a formal and an informal sector. We estimate our model using data from the National Income Dynamics Study, the first nationally representative panel study in South Africa. We run counterfactual experiments and show that health shocks have an important impact on wealth and consumption. The channel through which these shocks propagate strongly depends on the job status of individuals at the time of the shock. For formal workers, bad health reduces labor efficiency, which translates into lower earnings. For informal workers and the non-employed, the shock lowers the job finding rate and in- creases job separation into non-employment, which results in a surge in non-employment spells. As bad health spells persist more for non-employed than for employed individuals, the interaction between labor market risks and health risks generates a vicious circle. |
| Keywords: | Health, Wealth, Life cycle, Informality |
| JEL: | I14 I15 E26 O17 J46 J64 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2001&r=all |
| By: | Ronconi, Lucas (Centro de Investigación y Acción Social (CIAS)); Kanbur, Ravi (Cornell University); López-Cariboni, Santiago (Universidad de la República, Uruguay) |
| Abstract: | Contrary to the predictions of the insider–outsider model, we show that the large majority of outsiders in developing countries support, rather than oppose, protective labour regulations. This evidence holds across countries in different regions, across different types of protective labour regulations (i.e. severance payment, minimum wages, working time), and for different categories of outsiders (i.e. unemployed workers and employees without access to legally mandated labour benefits). We revise the economic and political assumptions of the insider–outsider model, discussing their empirical relevance in a developing country context. |
| Keywords: | informal, labour, segmentation, monopsony, fairness |
| JEL: | J4 J8 O17 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12831&r=all |