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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Johannes Buckenmaier (University of Cologne); Eugen Dimant (University of Pennsylvania); Luigi Mittone (University of Trento, Department of Economics and Management) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes tax payers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We do this through a leniency program. In our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior, but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency. We find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism, subjects collude and accept bribes less, while paying more taxes. We find no evidence that it encourages bribe offers. Our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases collusion and bribe acceptance rate, and it increases the collected tax yield. It also does not encourage bribe offers. In contrast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects, suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed. |
| Keywords: | collective action; cooperation; voluntary participation; experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-13&r=iue |
| By: | Frimmel, Wolfgang; Halla, Martin; Paetzold, Jörg |
| Abstract: | Does tax evasion run in the family? We study the case of the commuter tax allowance in Austria, which is designed as a step function of the commuting distance, creating sharp discontinuities at each bracket threshold. The data sources allow us to observe actual compliance behavior at the individual level. To identify a causal effect, we use the paternal distance-to-bracket as an IV for paternal compliance. We find that paternal noncompliance increases children's non-compliance by about 24%. |
| JEL: | H26 A13 H24 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168244&r=iue |
| By: | Panagiotis Delimatsis; Bernard Hoekman |
| Abstract: | Can a WTO Member discriminate against foreign suppliers of services located in jurisdictions that refuse to share information with a government to permit it to determine if its nationals engage in tax evasion? Does it matter if the Member uses standards developed by an international body as the criterion for deciding whether to impose measures? In Argentina—Financial Services the WTO Appellate Body held that services from jurisdictions that share financial tax information may be different from services provided by jurisdictions that do not cooperate in supplying such information. It overruled a Panel finding that measures to increase taxes on financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions were discriminatory. We argue that the AB reached the right conclusion but that an important opportunity was missed to clarify what WTO Members are permitted to do to enforce their domestic regulatory regimes, and how international standards could have a bearing on this question. By giving consideration to arguments that the likeness of services and service suppliers may be a function of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes, the AB increased the scope for confusion and future litigation. |
| Keywords: | tax evasion, tax havens, international regulatory cooperation, information exchange, transparency |
| JEL: | F51 G28 H26 H87 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2017/42&r=iue |
| By: | Cheriet, F. |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to analyze the diversity and breadth of managerial fraud practices through the involved agents perceptions’. For this, we exploited the results of two surveys of 28 private enterprises and public officials in nine different regions in Algeria. Our results showed widespread practices of corruption and commercial or tax fraud, with an institutionalization of practices, and the existence of rational process of innovation in the fraud. These fraud practices appear to be an efficient response of businesses to adapt organization to a complex administrative context, in an unstable economic environment and an abundance of public financial funds. ....French Abstract: L’objet de cet article est d’analyser la diversité et l’ampleur des pratiques de fraude managériale à travers les perceptions des acteurs impliqués. Pour cela, nous avons exploité les résultats de deux enquêtes menées auprès de 28 entrepreneurs privés et de 9 fonctionnaires publics dans différentes régions en Algérie. Nos résultats ont montré entre autres, une généralisation des pratiques de corruption et de fraude commerciale et fiscale, accompagnée d’une institutionnalisation des pratiques, et de l’existence de processus rationnel d’innovation dans la fraude. Ces pratiques de fraude apparaissent comme une réponse d’adaptation des entreprises à un contexte administratif complexe, à un environnement économique instable et à une abondance des disponibilités financières publiques. |
| Keywords: | FRAUD; ENTERPRISES; INSTITUTIONS; CORRUPTION; ALGERIA; FRAUDE; ENTREPRISES; INSTITUTIONS; CORRUPTION; ALGERIE |
| JEL: | G28 H32 K42 L26 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umr:wpaper:201705&r=iue |