nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2015‒12‒01
two papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance By Almunia, Miguel; Lopez-Rodriguez, David
  2. Optimal taxation and public provision for poverty reduction By Ravi Kanbur; Jukka Pirttilä; Matti Tuomala; Tuuli Ylinen

  1. By: Almunia, Miguel (University of Warwick and CAGE); Lopez-Rodriguez, David (Banco de España)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects on tax compliance of monitoring the information trails generated by firms’ activities. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than 6 million euros in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below this threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. This response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, implying that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We calculate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses.
    Keywords: tax enforcement, firms, bunching, Spain, Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) JEL Classification: H26, H32
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:245&r=iue
  2. By: Ravi Kanbur; Jukka Pirttilä; Matti Tuomala; Tuuli Ylinen
    Abstract: The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries, and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality conditions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and public goods for the poverty minimization case, and compare the results to those derived under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informality on optimal redistributive policies for such countries, and comment on the potential for minimum wage regulation. The exercise reveals nontrivial differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions. The derived formulae also capture the sufficient statistics that the governments need to pay attention to when designing poverty alleviation policies.
    Keywords: redistribution, income taxation, commodity taxation, public good provision, poverty Creation-Date: 2015; Economic growth, Investments, Panel analysis, Productivity
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2015-054&r=iue

This nep-iue issue is ©2015 by Catalina Granda Carvajal. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.