nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2015‒03‒05
four papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. Heterogeneous Responses to Effective Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Spanish Firms By Miguel Almunia; David Lopez-Rodriguez
  2. Taking the High Road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers By Jörg Paetzold; Hannes Winner
  3. On the effectiveness of short-time work schemes in dual labor markets By Victoria Osuna; J. Ignacio García-Pérez
  4. Содействие переходу к формальной экономике на примере некоторых государств - участников СНГ Арман Саргсян, Болат Татыбеков, Ирина Соболева, Елена Кубишин, Марина Баскакова By Sargsyan, Arman; Tatybekov, B; Soboleva, I; Kubishin, E; Baskakova, M

  1. By: Miguel Almunia (University of Warwick); David Lopez-Rodriguez (Banco de España)
    Abstract: We investigate whether monitoring the information trails generated by firms’ activities improves tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU) in Spain, which devotes additional resources to verifying the transactions reported by firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms bunch below this threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement, and this reaction is stronger in sectors where paper trail is easier to monitor. These results suggest that monitoring efforts by the tax authority and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements, and both are necessary for effective tax enforcement.
    Keywords: tax enforcement, firms, bunching, Spain, Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU).
    JEL: H26 H32
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Jörg Paetzold (University of Salzburg); Hannes Winner (University of Salzburg)
    Abstract: We provide first field evidence on evasion spillovers as an important determinant of the individual compliance decision. Exploiting discontinuities in a self-reported commuter tax allowance, we observe a substantial share of taxpayers misreporting their claims. Using exogenous variation in job changes we find that individual evasion decisions are influenced by the compliance behaviour of other co-workers, with job changers from low- to high-cheating companies starting to evade much more after they move. In contrast, movers from high- to low-cheating companies do not alter their reporting. The most likely explanation is information transmission, including increased knowledge about the possibilities for non-compliance.
    Keywords: Tax Evasion, Self-Reporting, Spillover Eects, Information Frictions industrial clusters, infrastructure
    JEL: H24 H26 D83
    Date: 2014
  3. By: Victoria Osuna; J. Ignacio García-Pérez
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the effectiveness of short-time work (STW) schemes for preserving jobs and reducing the segmentation between stable and unstable jobs observed in dual labour markets. For this purpose, we develop and simulate an equilibrium search and matching model considering the situation of the Spanish 2012 labour market reform as a benchmark. Our steady-state results show that the availability of STW schemes does not necessarily reduce unemployment and job destruction. The effectiveness of this measure depends on the degree of subsidization of payroll taxes it may entail: with a 33% subsidy, we find that STW is quite beneficial for the Spanish economy because it reduces both unemployment and labour market segmentation. We also perform a cost-benefit analysis that shows that there is scope for Pareto improvements when STW is subsidized. Again, the STW scenario with a 33% subsidy on payroll taxes seems the most beneficial because more than 57% of workers improve. These workers also experience a significant increase in annual income that could be used to compensate the losers from this policy change and the State for the fiscal balance deterioration. This reform saves the highest number of jobs and has the lowest deadweight costs.
    Date: 2015–02
  4. By: Sargsyan, Arman; Tatybekov, B; Soboleva, I; Kubishin, E; Baskakova, M
    Abstract: Analyzes the main reasons of informal employment at SMEs and looks for decisions to stimulate formal employment in the CIS countries.
    Keywords: employment, informal employment, informal economy, role of ILO, international labour standards, employment policy, social protection, CIS countries, emploi, emploi informel, économie informelle, rôle de l'OIT, normes internationales du travail, politique de l'emploi, protection sociale, pays CEI, empleo, empleo informal, economía informal, papel de la OIT, normas internacionales del trabajo, política de empleo, protección social, países CEI
    Date: 2014

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