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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Bilgin, Cevat |
| Abstract: | Tax morale is defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, and is closely related to tax compliance. Determinants of tax morale need to be investigated for a more comprehensive understanding of tax compliance. In this paper, determinants of tax morale in Turkey and Spain are analysed on the basis of World Values Survey data. Firstly, descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models are provided. Since tax morale is an ordered categorical dependent variable, ordered probit models are estimated separately for Turkey and Spain to derive the relations between tax morale and relevant variables. Marginal effects are computed since the coefficients of the models cannot be interpreted because of the nonlinearity of the estimated models. The marginal effects related to the top level of tax morale category are presented. The independent variables are combined by demographic factors, employment categories, economic status of the respondents and social capital variables. The findings from the estimated model suggest that social capital variables and some of the demographic factors have important effects on tax morale in Turkey. Confidence variables have positive effects; if taxpayers feel confidence in political entities they are willing to pay taxes. Religion and national pride affect tax morale positively. On the other hand, the results are different for Spain; social capital variables do not have effects on tax morale. Specifically, confidence variables are found to be statistically insignificant. Age, education level and the income level have significant effects on tax morale in Spain. |
| Keywords: | Tax morale; tax evasion; ordered probit. |
| JEL: | C51 C52 H26 H30 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57204&r=iue |
| By: | Diana Mitlin |
| Abstract: | This paper explores what we have learnt about how to instigate, negotiate or otherwise secure pro-poor government in towns and cities of the global South. With competition for scarce resources, the processes of urban development, and specifically the acquisition of land and basic services, are intensely political. While the nature of urban poverty differs, there is a consistent set of needs related to residency in informal settlements; tenure is insecure and there is a lack of access to basic services, infrastructure, and sometimes other entitlements. Households and communities have to negotiate these collective consumption goods in a context in which political relations are primarily informal, with negotiations that take place away from the transparent and accountable systems of 'modern' government. Clientelist bargaining prevails. Much of the existing literature is polarised, either critiquing clientelism for its consequences, or arguing that it has been dismissed without any grounded assessment of what might take its place and any considered analysis of what it has managed to deliver. In this paper I explore how networks and federations of the urban poor seeking to access secure tenure and basic services have sought to advance their cause and the interests of their members. These organised collectives recognise that they have to challenge clientelist practice; however leaders also recognise that, given existing power relations, they have to work from within to change the realities of clientelism. Their own relative powerlessness means that confrontation is not an effective strategy. To strengthen their influence, they have to make common cause with those in need across the city building a unified and aware movement, and they have to establish their own legitimacy as agencies operating in the public interest and towards the common good. As and when they gain an increased influence, they seek greater flexibility from the city bureaucracy and to reduce the hierarchical highly vertical relations between the urban poor and the political elite. To maintain and extend their advances towards a pro-poor politics, they act to strengthen public accountabilities. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:esid-034-14&r=iue |
| By: | Jellal, Mohamed |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in fostering corruption. Therfore, this endemic corruption can explain the lack of productive performance of industrial . Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth |
| Keywords: | Industrial Firms , Competition ,Tax Evasion ,Corruption, Rents, competition policy, |
| JEL: | D73 H26 K2 K42 L1 L5 |
| Date: | 2014–07–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57284&r=iue |
| By: | Roberto Angulo; Alejandro Gaviria; Liliana Morales |
| Abstract: | Este trabajo estudia la evolución reciente de las condiciones de vida en Colombia con un énfasis en el crecimiento de la clase media. Entre 2002 y 2011, el ingreso per cápita real de los hogares creció 36%, la participación de la clase media en la población total pasó de 16% a 27% y la pobreza disminuyó de 50% a 34% Adicionalmente, los hogares de todos los grupos sociales mejoraron sus condiciones de vida en varias dimensiones: educación, salud, trabajo y características de las viviendas, entre otras. A pesar del aumento reciente, el tamaño de la clase media en Colombia sigue siendo relativamente menor al de otros países latinoamericanos y los hogares de clase media no han superado los problemas estructurales de informalidad laboral y bajo nivel educativo. |
| Keywords: | pobreza, clase media, vulnerabilidad, bienestar |
| JEL: | O54 I32 |
| Date: | 2013–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:011895&r=iue |