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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Hartmut Lehmann; Anzelika Zaiceva |
| Abstract: | This paper takes stock of informal employment in Russia analyzing its incidence and determinants, developing several measures of informal employment and demonstrating that the incidence varies widely across the different definitions. We, however, show that the determinants of informal employment are roughly stable across the different measures. We also estimate an informal-formal wage gap at the means and across the entire wage distributions. We find only weak evidence for labor market segmentation in Russia for salaried workers but establish a segmented informal sector with a lower free entry tier and an upper rationed tier when including the self-employed and entrepreneurs Classification-JEL: J31, J40, P23 |
| Keywords: | Informal employment, transition economies, labor market segmentation, Russia Length: pages 39 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:098&r=iue |
| By: | Olivier Bargain (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM), IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor); Prudence Kwenda (University of Witwatersrand - University of Witwatersrand) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the informal-formal sector pay gap throughout the conditional wage distribution using panel data from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. We control for time-invariant unobservables and identification is stemming from inter-sector movers. We control for observables in a non-linear way using propensity score reweighting and carefully check for potential measurement errors. Using similar definitions of informality, we obtain consistent results for all three countries: Informally employed workers earn much less than formal workers primarily because of lower observable and unobservable skills. Estimates of the conditional wage gap show that they are also underpaid compared to their formal sector counterparts. In all three countries, the informal wage penalty is larger in the lower part of the conditional distribution and tends to disappear at the top, i.e., the informal sector increases wage dispersion. The magnitudes of these effects vary across countries, with the largest penalties in lower conditional quantiles of South Africa and more modest wage gaps in Latin America. We suggest explanations in line with different legal and labor market conditions. |
| Keywords: | wage gap; informal sector; quantile regression; fixed effects; propensity score; conditional random effects |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00967324&r=iue |
| By: | Silfverberg, Denise Valerie |
| Abstract: | The Individually Paying Program (IPP) is the voluntary component of the Philippines` social health insurance program. The program caters to those in the informal sector and those without a formal employer-employee relationship. Coverage levels for the IPP were found to be considerably low with a regional average of 57 percent and a provincial average of 53 percent. Massive variation between provinces was found. Four important factors were identified when looking into said variation. First, availability and accessibility is an issue. Second, substitution effect between private and public facilities was observed. Third, income levels do not appear to be a factor in determining the level of insurance coverage. Lastly, the size of certain sectors had a significant effect on the coverage levels observed in the province. Although there is a need to corroborate the findings with an individual-level analysis, these results are good indicators to start with in order to address the lack of coverage in the voluntary program of PhilHealth. |
| Keywords: | health care financing, Philippines, social health insurance, universal coverage, informal sector, voluntary program |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phd:dpaper:dp_2014-15&r=iue |
| By: | Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Thomas Le Texier (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France) |
| Abstract: | In the case of digital piracy should rights be publicly or privately enforced? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of non-monitored illegal channels raise important issues for the design of digital anti-piracy policies. In this paper, we study the impact of these two enforcement settings (public vs. private) in the presence of an illegal non-monitored outside option for users. Taking account of market outcomes, we show that in both cases, the optimal strategies of the legal seller and the monitoring authority leads to rejection of the outside option out while accommodating to the presence of illegal monitored channels. Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement generates higher monitoring levels and lower price levels. Public enforcement also generates greater (legal) welfare. However, we identify potential con ict of interests between the legal seller and the social planner when the eciency of non monitored networks is low. We provide some insights into the role of supply side anti-piracy policies. |
| Keywords: | copyright infringement, law enforcement, digital piracy, illegal file-sharing, illegal behavior deterrence |
| JEL: | D23 D78 K42 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201403&r=iue |
| By: | Markus Pasche (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | In case of digital goods such like music, intellectual property rights are typically not exerted by the creators (artists) but by intermediaries. Their profits, and therefore also the income of the artists, are endangered by copyright infringements (piracy). It is well known from static welfare analysis that to some extent piracy reduces the deadweight loss by limiting monopoly power and could therefore increase welfare. This paper contributes to the discussion by including the costs of law enforcement into the welfare analysis. Most models in the literature assume that law is enforced by governmental activities. In contrast, this paper considers that law enforcement is exerted by agents (e.g. lawyer chancellories, provider of screening technologies) which are also seen as intermediaries. The enforcement effort is therefore endogenously determined. It is shown that this will lead to suboptimal welfare outcomes. A social planner has to regulate punishment and enforcement effort to a moderate level. A more rigorous fight against piracy could only be justified by negative dynamic welfare effects due to a loss of creativity. However, there is no empirical evidence for that. |
| Keywords: | digital goods, music, piracy, copyright, intermediation, law en- forcement, welfare |
| JEL: | D60 L12 K11 K42 |
| Date: | 2014–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-008&r=iue |
| By: | Etienne Wasmer (Département d'économie); Nicolas Lepage-Saucier; Juliette Schleich |
| Abstract: | Bien que peu prisé des syndicats de salariés et des représentants patronaux, le contrat unique reste paradoxalement au coeur du débat public. Si le contrat unique semble à première vue être une réponse séduisante pour réduire le dualisme, il ne règle pas pour autant les problèmes liés à la précarité et à l’impact de la protection de l’emploi ; ceuxci peuvent être traités par des politiques alternatives ciblées plus efficaces. De plus, bien que réels, les coûts du dualisme sont moins évidents et moins bien démontrés que ceux engendrés par la protection de l’emploi. Enfin, la suppression des CDD entrainerait, à protection inchangée, une perte d’emploi importante car tous ces emplois ne seraient pas remplacés par des CDI compte tenu de la prudence à l’embauche des entreprises. Un assouplissement fort de la protection de l’emploi prévue dans ce nouveau contrat unique serait alors nécessaire, mais il peut d’ores et déjà intervenir dans les cadres légaux actuels et n’a pas à être lié à un nouveau contrat : des contreparties en termes d’assurance chômage ou de formation professionnelle sont possibles. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8tj78lbn&r=iue |
| By: | Carlos Henrique L. Corseuil; Marcelo Côrtes Neri; Gabriel Ulyssea |
| Abstract: | Este texto apresenta uma análise exploratória dos potenciais impactos da Lei do Empreendedor Individual (LMEI). O objetivo é trazer evidências que contribuam para esclarecer, ainda que parcialmente, se a política teve êxito em promover: i) o microempreendedorismo no Brasil; e ii) a formalização dos empreendedores individuais. Em relação à promoção do microempreendedorismo, há evidências de que a política pode ter atingido este objetivo. Cabe destacar, no entanto, que as evidências deste trabalho são compatíveis com empresários maiores reduzindo a escala para se enquadrarem no programa, e também com a possibilidade de que algumas empresas, em particular as menores, estejam usando o programa para trocar uma relação de trabalho assalariado por uma de prestação de serviços. A formalização dos empreendedores individuais parece ter sido afetada positivamente pela política no que diz respeito à contribuição para a previdência, mas não à inscrição no Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jurídica (CNPJ). This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the potential impacts from a formalization policy introduced in Brazil targeted at micro entrepreneurs with at most one employee. Our goal is to provide evidence to shed light on the following points: i) Did the program fostered micro entrepreneurship? ii) Did the program lead to greater formalization rates? The evidence suggests that the program might have positive effects on both points. |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1939&r=iue |
| By: | Cetrángolo, Oscar; Goldschmit, Ariela; Gómez Sabaíni, Juan Carlos; Morán, Dalmiro |
| Keywords: | informal economy, informal workers, social protection, social security, contributions, Argentina, économie informelle, travailleurs informels, protection sociale, sécurité sociale, cotisations, Argentine, economía informal, trabajadores informales, protección social, seguridad social, cotizaciones, Argentina |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:484593&r=iue |