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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Amadeo Piolatto; Matthew Rablen |
| Abstract: | The standard expected utility model of tax evasion predicts that evasion is decreasing in the marginal tax rate (the Yitzhaki Puzzle). The existing literature disagrees on whether prospect theory overturns the puzzle. We disentangle four distinct elements of prospect theory and find loss aversion and probability weighting to be redundant in endogenous specification of the reference level. These classes include, as special cases, the most common specifications in the literature. New specifications of the reference level are needed, we conclude. |
| Keywords: | prospect theory, tax evasion, Yitzhaki puzzle, stigma, diminishing sensitivity, reference dependence, endogenous audit probability, endogenous reference level |
| JEL: | H26 D81 K42 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:13/25&r=iue |
| By: | Ghani, Ejaz; O'Connell, Stephen D.; Sharma, Gunjan |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the interaction between formal (organized) and informal (unorganized) plants in the manufacturing sector in India. How has the size and productivity of the plants in the organized sector affected the plants in the unorganized sector? How have informal plants affected formal plants? Are the magnitudes of the effects symmetric in either direction? The evidence shows that there are positive horizontal and vertical spillovers in each direction. Informal firms are an important supplier of inputs to formal firms. Employment and output in the organized sector is greater in those states in India that have a greater presence of unorganized suppliers of inputs. Conversely, unorganized employment and output are greater in states that have a greater presence of organized buyers of inputs. But there are two important asymmetries in the relationship between the organized and unorganized sectors. First, the unorganized sector is much more dependent on and responsive to organized sector presence than vice versa. Second, unorganized sector productivity is dependent on and responsive to organized sector productivity and presence but the reverse is not true. |
| Keywords: | Labor Policies,Water and Industry,Labor Markets,Industrial Management,E-Business |
| Date: | 2013–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6588&r=iue |
| By: | Maëlle Della Peruta (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis [UNS]); Dominique Torre (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis [UNS]) |
| Abstract: | Alternative currencies continue to develop all around the world, taking various forms (material or immaterial) and ful ll various functions. They are created in order to promote the local economy development and to ght against social exclusion. They are principally aimed to low income people (retired or unemployed people, or people who are living with a low wage). In this paper, we analyze the particular case of virtual currency circulation inside a local community of unemployed people. We elaborate on the assumptions that the organization of LETS and the circulation of complementary currencies have two properties: (i) they help unemployed workers to overcome the double coincidence of want necessity of an informal sector founded on barter exchange; (ii) they help to maintain and develop workers' skills outside job, helping them to observe opportunities of employment even as long-term unemployed workers. We study the global properties of a job market associating traditional short-term and long-term unemployment to the organization of LETS. Using a theoretical Pissarides-style model, we nd that the initial level of trust of agents in the complementary currency(cies) but also the e ective properties of his(these) currency(cies) are crucial for LETS to become permanent institutions. We also nd that if the stationary equilibrium of the job-market includes LETS, then LETS have a positive in uence on the rate of employment, on the expected utility of employed workers, and are Pareto improving when the benchmark case is a job market without any LETS. |
| Keywords: | Social currencies, complementary currencies, unemployment, informal sector. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00856480&r=iue |
| By: | Jean-Louis Arcand (GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES - GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES - GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES); Linguère Mously MBAYE (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to provide the first evidence concerning the relationship between time and risk preferences and illegal migration in an African context. Based upon our theoretical model and using a unique data set on potential migrants collected in urban Senegal, we evaluate a measure of time and risk preferences through the individual's intertemporal discount rate and coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Remarkably, our results show that these individual preferences matter in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler. |
| Keywords: | Illegal migration; Discount rate; Risk aversion; Africa; Senegal |
| Date: | 2013–08–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00855937&r=iue |