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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Jeremy de Beer (U. Ottawa); Kun Fu (Imperial College); Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (World Intellectual Property Organization, Economics and Statistics Division, Geneva, Switzerland) |
| JEL: | E26 O12 O17 O3 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:10&r=iue |
| By: | Camacho, Adriana; Conover, Emily; Hoyos, Alejandro |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether the Colombian government's expansion of social programs in the early 1990s, particularly the publicly provided health insurance, discouraged formal employment. Using household survey data and variation across municipalities in the onset of interviews for the SISBEN, the instrument used to identify beneficiaries for public health insurance, it shows robust and consistent estimates of an increase in informal employment of approximately 4 percentage points. Similar results are obtained using an alternative dataset, consisting of a panel of individuals interviewed for the first and second SISBEN. The findings suggest that marginal individuals optimized when deciding whether to participate in the formal sector. |
| Keywords: | Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Markets,Health Systems Development&Reform,Labor Policies,Population Policies |
| Date: | 2013–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6564&r=iue |
| By: | Weinreich, Daniel |
| Abstract: | We shed some light on fairness preferences regarding tax evasion. Individuals perceive income inequality which they are responsible for as fair (e.g. work effort) while inequality resulting from factors outside their reach is regarded as unfair (e.g. productivity or wage rate). This affects the incentives to hide income from tax authorities and supply labor. We set up a model where individuals simultaneously choose unreported income and work effort given a linear taxation scheme. We show the conditions for which individuals respond with lower or higher unreported income and work effort when fair tax evasion is introduced. Beyond, it can be shown that unreported income increases while work effort decreases when the tax rate is raised. Finally, we consider a majority voting over redistributive taxation. Thereby, it is shown that the median voter prefers lower (higher) taxation if she evades less (more) taxes than would be fair since raising the tax rate would enlarge (reduce) the deviation from fair tax evasion. This affects the moral cost as peceived by the individuals. |
| Keywords: | redistributive taxation, majority voting fairness, tax evasion, labor supply |
| JEL: | D31 D78 H26 H30 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48919&r=iue |
| By: | Arcand, Jean-Louis (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva); Mbaye, Linguère Mously (IZA) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to provide the first evidence concerning the relationship between time and risk preferences and illegal migration in an African context. Based upon our theoretical model and using a unique data set on potential migrants collected in urban Senegal, we evaluate a measure of time and risk preferences through the individual's intertemporal discount rate and coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Remarkably, our results show that these individual preferences matter in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler. |
| Keywords: | illegal migration, discount rate, risk aversion, Africa, Senegal |
| JEL: | F22 O15 O16 R23 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7517&r=iue |
| By: | Wasmer, Etienne (Département d'économie); Lepage-Saucier, Nicolas; Schleich, Juliette |
| Abstract: | Bien que peu prisé des syndicats de salariés et des représentants patronaux, le contrat unique reste paradoxalement au coeur du débat public. Si le contrat unique semble à première vue être une réponse séduisante pour réduire le dualisme, il ne règle pas pour autant les problèmes liés à la précarité et à l’impact de la protection de l’emploi ; ceuxci peuvent être traités par des politiques alternatives ciblées plus efficaces. De plus, bien que réels, les coûts du dualisme sont moins évidents et moins bien démontrés que ceux engendrés par la protection de l’emploi. Enfin, la suppression des CDD entrainerait, à protection inchangée, une perte d’emploi importante car tous ces emplois ne seraient pas remplacés par des CDI compte tenu de la prudence à l’embauche des entreprises. Un assouplissement fort de la protection de l’emploi prévue dans ce nouveau contrat unique serait alors nécessaire, mais il peut d’ores et déjà intervenir dans les cadres légaux actuels et n’a pas à être lié à un nouveau contrat : des contreparties en termes d’assurance chômage ou de formation professionnelle sont possibles. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:sciepo:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8tj78lbn&r=iue |