|
on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Cécile Bazart (LAMETA, University of Montpellier I, France); Aurélie Bonein (University of Rennes 1 - CREM UMR CNRS 6211, France) |
| Abstract: | Reciprocity considerations are important to the tax compliance problem as they may explain the global dynamics of tax evasion, beyond individual tax evasion decisions, toward a downward or upward spiral. To provide evidence on reciprocity in tax compliance decisions, we have conducted a laboratory experiment in which we introduced two types of inequities. The first type of inequity is called vertical, because it refers to inequities introduced by the government when it sets different fiscal parameters for identical taxpayers, while the second type of inequity is called horizontal because it refers to the fact that taxpayers may differ in tax compliance decisions. In this setting, taxpayers may react to a disadvantageous or advantageous inequity through negative or positive reciprocal behaviors, respectively. Our results support the existence of negative and positive reciprocity in both vertical and horizontal cases. When both inequities come into play and may induce reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal always dominates the vertical. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Fairness; Tax evasion; Tax compliance |
| JEL: | H26 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201239&r=iue |
| By: | Christian Daude; Hamlet Gutiérrez; Ángel Melguizo |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the literature and contributes with some evidence based on the World Values Survey on the drivers of tax morale around the world, with an emphasis on developing countries. It shows that socio-economic factors such as age, religion, gender, employment status and educational attainment have a significant impact on people’s levels of tax morale. In terms of institutional determinants, it finds that the satisfaction with democracy, trust in government and the satisfaction with the quality of public services plays an important role in increasing tax morale. The paper also discusses future directions for research and policy action in this area.<BR>Cet article propose une revue de la littérature existante et apporte de nouveaux éléments empiriques sur la base de données provenant de la World Values Survey, sur les déterminants de la morale fiscale dans le monde, et dans les pays en développement en particulier. Il montre que les facteurs socio-économiques tels que l’âge, la religion, le genre, la situation professionnelle et la réussite scolaire ont un effet significatif sur le degré de morale fiscale des individus. Concernant les déterminants institutionnels, l’article montre que le degré de morale fiscale des individus dépend également du niveau de satisfaction avec le système démocratique, de confiance dans le gouvernement et de satisfaction quant à la qualité des services publics. L’article conclut en proposant des pistes/orientations futures de recherche et des recommandations politiques dans ce domaine. |
| Keywords: | tax policy, developing countries, tax morale, politique fiscale, pays en développement, morale fiscale |
| JEL: | E62 I38 P16 |
| Date: | 2012–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:devaaa:315-en&r=iue |
| By: | AfDB |
| Date: | 2012–11–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adb:adbwps:437&r=iue |
| By: | Simplice A, Asongu |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to assess how financial sector competition plays out in the development of knowledge economy (KE). It contributes at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and response to the growing field of KE by means of informal sector promotion, micro finance and mobile banking. It suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of various financial sectors on different components of KE. The variables identified under the World Bank’s four knowledge economy index (KEI) are employed. Three hypotheses based on seven propositions are tested. Results show: (1) the informal financial sector, a previously missing component in the definition of the financial system by the IMF significantly affects KE dimensions; (2) disentangling different components of the existing measurement of the financial system improves dynamics in the KE-finance nexus and; (3) introduction of measures of sector importance provides relevant new insights into how financial sector competition affects KE. |
| Keywords: | Financial development; Knowledge Economy |
| JEL: | P00 O10 O34 P48 G21 |
| Date: | 2012–08–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43009&r=iue |
| By: | Simplice A , Asongu |
| Abstract: | In the current efforts towards harmonizing IPRs regimes in the African continent, this paper provides answers to four key questions relevant in the policy decision making processes. After empirically examining the questions, the following findings are established. (1) In comparison to common law countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant autonomous rate of piracy; consistent with the ‘law and property rights’ theory. (2) But for IPRs laws, the other IP protection channels (WIPO treaties, Main IP law and Multilateral treaties) reduce the incidence of piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law countries appear to mitigate piracy more than in common law countries. (4) Formal institutions are instrumental in the fight against piracy through IPRs protection channels. |
| Keywords: | Software piracy; Intellectual property rights; Panel data; Africa |
| JEL: | F42 O38 O34 O57 K42 |
| Date: | 2012–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:42766&r=iue |
| By: | Christian Schluter (University of Southampton); Jackline Wahba (University of Southampton and IZA) |
| Abstract: | We consider the issue of illegal migration from Mexico to the US, and examine whether the lack of legal status causally impacts on outcomes, specifically wages and remitting behavior. These outcomes are of particular interest given the extent of legal and illegal migration, and the resulting financial flows. We formalize this question and highlight the principal empirical problem using a potential outcome framework with endogenous selection. The selection bias is captured by a control function, which is estimated non-parametrically. The framework for remitting is extended to allow for endogenous regressors (e.g. wages). We propose a new reparametrisation of the control function, which is linear in case of a normal error structure, and test linearity. Using Mexican Migration project data, we find considerable and robust illegality effects on wages, the penalty being about 12% in the 1980s and 22% in the 1990s. For the latter period, the selection bias is not created by a normal error structure; wrongly imposing normality overestimates the illegality effect on wages by 50%, while wrongly ignoring selection leads to a 50% underestimate. In contrast to these wage penalties, legal status appears to have mixed effects on remitting behavior. |
| Keywords: | illegal migration, illegality effects, counterfactuals, selection, control functions, non-parametric estimation, intermediate outcomes, Mexican Migration Project |
| JEL: | J61 J30 J40 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nor:wpaper:2012037&r=iue |