| Abstract: | 
The cross-national empirics of the international asylum system are in their 
infancy. While Hatton, 2009, and Neumayer, 2005, 2006a and 2006b provided 
important and valuable cross-national insights on the drivers of the asylum 
seeking process, as yet little is known in terms of hard-core evidence about 
the effects of asylum-driven migration processes on the recipient countries. 
But such analyses are necessary, since asylum plays such an important role in 
the overall South-North migration process, and several international decision 
makers, especially on the European level, are increasingly stressing the 
necessity to get asylum seekers into employment, while others – like the 
Austrian Ministry of the Interior in its long-term strategy, published in 2012 
– vehemently argue in favour of a clear separation between legal, 
employment-related migration and asylum. Will ‘getting asylum seekers into 
employment’ have any effects on social and economic development, or will it 
motivate more and more people to emigrate for work as “free riders” of the 
asylum system? This paper should preliminarily attempt to close this widening 
and politically highly relevant research gap. The EU's total population was 
502.5 million, with a yearly increase of 0.5 million due to natural population 
increase and 0.9 million due to net migration. While the European Union 
accepts about 2.4 million immigrants per year from third countries, among them 
more than 800.000 people in the framework of work visas, and more than 750.000 
people under the title of family reunifications, 260.000 to 300.000 people 
apply for asylum each year. All official European Commission data, surveyed in 
this article, seem to suggest that asylum and illegal migration are part and 
parcel of the overall migration process. While on average ¾ of the asylum 
applications in Europe are being rejected by the authorities as unfounded, 
there was a stock of up to 4.5 million illegal residents already residing in 
the entire EU-27; and in addition, we can assume that around 450.000 illegal 
entrants are apprehended each year at the EU external borders. The illegal 
inflow and shadow economy migration statistics also have to take into account 
the around 340.000 persons, denied entry each year, suggesting that the 
overall shadow migration pressure, resulting from unfounded asylum and illegal 
or rejected entries amounts to more than 1 million people each year, by far 
exceeding the 800.000 work visas granted annually. Thus there is an urgent 
political need to act. The somewhat surprising, but undisputable net end 
result of all these European immigration procedures (work visas, family 
re-unifications, and other migration) up to now was a sharp and clear-cut rise 
in the total stock of the resident population in Europe from only three 
countries: Turkey (approx. 2.4 million), Morocco (approx. 1.8 million) and 
Albania (approx. 1 million). They are the absolute winners of the hitherto 
existing de-facto European migration ‘policy’. The combined size of illegal 
border crossings, denied entry applications, and rejected asylum applications 
of more than 1.0 million persons seems to suggest that indeed there exists a 
huge migration-related shadow economy (Graphs 1-3). Our ensuing data analysis 
is based on the tradition of cross-national development accounting, using an 
expanded version of the Tausch, 2012b data set (“Corvinus University data 
set”) and UNDP, 2009 and UNHCR, 2012 figures on migration. We start these 
empirical cross-national analyses by providing some calculations about the 
societal effects of the well-known Migration Policy Index, which measures the 
general institutional ease with which migration recipient countries integrate 
migrants economically in general. Our calculations reconfirm the reservations 
by the present author (Tausch, 2010, 2012) against the generalized neo-liberal 
thesis that a free migration process automatically ensures economic 
prosperity. With the level of development and the overall conditions of the 
migration process being constant, there are some very serious and significant 
negative partial correlations of the MIPEX Index with indicators of political 
participation and the fight against discrimination. Our data also show the 
significant pull-factors, caused by an open migration regime, as measured by 
the MIPEX Index, as well as the societal consequences of a high MIPEX Index 
score - growing xenophobia against the weakest groups in society - such as the 
Roma and Sintis, an ensuing growing public debt burden, and lower economic 
growth. One might still argue that, on ethical grounds, one should be still in 
favour of increasing MIPEX index performance, but in terms of its societal 
consequences, our results suggest to be pessimistic. We then move on to 
analyse systematically the effects of the UNDP cross-national migration 
variables on socio-economic development and vice versa. Our hypothesis is that 
opening the gates of unlimited access of asylum seekers to the labour market 
an even more substantial number of people would decide to enter the labour 
markets in the developed countries in Europe via the asylum procedure, thus 
thwarting any attempts to arrive at a more education and skill oriented 
immigration system. We try to corroborate this by first looking into the 
question of the relationship between access liberalization, measured by the 
MIPEX Index, and the UNDP documented asylum burden rate (Graph 1 and 2). 
Although the relationship is not too strong, there are some positive 
trade-offs between the two variables. In Table 3 of this study, we then 
provide a very clear-cut argument on how a migration policy, based on asylum 
influx, is ill-conceived, and several important phenomena are significantly 
being undermined - internal security, the balance of tolerance in society, 
gender relations, education, and environmental conditions. Our partial 
correlation analysis shows that with increasing dependence on the immigration 
system based on the influx of asylum seekers, there is a significantly larger 
societal acceptance of the value orientation that men have precedence on the 
labour market over women when jobs are scarce; and in addition, the import of 
polluting goods and raw materials; maternal mortality, terrorist attacks, and 
the violations of civil rights and political rights increase, independent from 
the development level reached and the general conditions of the migration 
process being in place. The near bankruptcy of the current de facto existing 
European asylum-based migration policy is also reflected in Table 4 of this 
study – documenting the partial correlations of asylum seekers per head of 
population with processes of socio-economic development. Again, the level of 
development and general overall conditions of the migration process were held 
constant. Crime rates, macho values, and the terrorist threat increase 
significantly, while fiscal freedom, growth prospects in the current crisis 
and the employment of older workers are being curtailed, and important areas 
of environmental policy, measured by the Yale-Columbia environment policy data 
series, are again being negatively affected. In addition, also the World 
Values Survey data on the work ethics of society are negatively being affected 
by an asylum-based migration system. Table 5 then documents the positive 
effects of work permit requirements for asylum seekers, still in place in 
several European countries and documented by the European 
Commission/Europäische Kommission (2012), on various socio-economic indicators 
from the Tausch 2012b Corvinus data set, including environment data, economic 
growth, education, and World Values Survey indicators of tolerance and 
volunteer activities. Social security, growth, environmental policy, 
education, health, liberal values in society - all these are positively 
affected by a work permit regime for asylum seekers in Europe, which the 
European Commission seems to be inclined to abolish. Table 6 shows the 
sobering results of the determinants of average economic growth rates in the 
EU-27 in the era of the current world economic crisis, 2008 to 2011. The 
crisis hit the poorer EU countries - ceteris paribus - far harder than the 
richer countries, and immigration rates are a significant negative determinant 
of growth, while the work permits regime for asylum seekers significantly and 
positively affects economic growth. Table 7 shows our final estimates of the 
determinants of asylum burden rates in the world system. In addition to the 
famous "bell-curve" of the levels of development, private health expenditures 
and the military personnel rates are significant drivers of asylum burden 
rates, while we also show that dependency from the large transnational 
corporations (measured by UNCTAD data on MNC penetration and its rise over 
time) are conducive to such higher asylum burden rates. Thus, we can show that 
traditional quantitative approaches to international development, initiated by 
the Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier, which are based on UNCTAD data on MNC 
penetration and its rise over time, explain well contemporary social asylum 
process realities of the world today. By contrast, an employment policy 
favouring the employment rates of older workers generally deters higher asylum 
dependency ratios. In Tables 8a and 8b, we finally show bivariate and partial 
correlations of asylum procedure global recognition rates, as documented by 
the UNHCR for 2010, and key variables of socio-economic development, as 
documented in Tausch, 2012a, 2012b. Our results again would caution against an 
asylum-based or asylum-driven immigration policy. We conclude by saying that 
the European Commission would be well advised to seek to redistribute current 
asylum inflows from countries like Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Austria to other EU-member countries, thus providing more fairness in the 
current Schengen system. Doubling or even tripling the European numbers of 
legal work permits would also be an advisable strategy, and Europe should 
seriously consider the new Austrian migration procedure for third-country 
nationals (Red-White-Red-card) as a best practice model. |