| Abstract: |
This article proposes a novel moral synthesis between Adam Smith’s
Enlightenment conception of the impartial spectator and the Abrahamic concept
of Ādamiyyah. It argues that while Smith’s theory offers a robust model of
internal moral regulation, its reliance on socially constructed norms leaves
it vulnerable to moral relativism and cultural fragmentation. In contrast,
Ādamiyyah, rooted in Qur’anic anthropology, provides a fixed ontological
foundation for human dignity, affirming rights and duties by virtue of being
human. Through a comparative philosophical methodology, this paper
demonstrates that Ādamiyyah can validate self-regard as sacred and universal,
while also anchoring the impartial spectator in a transcendent framework of
accountability. Ibn Khaldūn’s notion of wāziʿ min anfusihim, the internal
restraining power, offers an applied articulation of this synthesis. It
mirrors Smith’s impartial spectator as a mechanism of self-regulation, yet
grounds it in the Adamic dignity of Ādamiyyah, where moral restraint links the
self to both divine accountability and social order. The article further
employs the metaphor of the fixed-point theorem from mathematics to
conceptualize Ādamiyyah as an invariant moral constant, stabilizing ethical
reasoning across cultural and technological transformations. By addressing
both individual moral formation and institutional justice, this framework
resolves the micro–macro divide in ethics. The paper concludes by proposing
that this integration contributes to the emerging discourse on “Rooted
Futures, ” a call to design inclusive, ethically grounded futures by drawing
on the enduring insights of classical moral traditions, and to renew the
Adamic covenant of human dignity that signifies the primordial moral bond
between humanity and God vertically, and among human beings horizontally.
Reclaiming this covenant not only restores a global moral order grounded in
justice, equality, and the inviolability of every person, but also provides
the impartial spectator with the transcendent moral anchor it lacked, thereby
closing the gap between self-regard and universal moral responsibility. |