| By: |
Metin M. Cosgel (University of Connecticut);
Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut);
Emre Özer (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: |
The decisive oath is an interesting but little-known element in some legal
proceedings, mostly in civil law traditions. It is different from ordinary
(testimonial) oaths that are routinely administered to witnesses at trial with
the aim of eliciting only truthful testimony, but which are of dubious value
in achieving that end. By contrast, a decisive oath can end a lawsuit in cases
where the plaintiff has no evidence. We use a simple economic model of
litigation to examine the impact of the decisive oath in resolving lawsuits.
To test the implications of the model, we focus on the relationship between
the stakes of the case and litigation outcomes by using data from the early
nineteenth century Ottoman courts. The results show that (1) resolution by
trial rather than settlement was more likely as the stakes increased; (2)
among cases that did not settle, trial by evidence rather than oath was more
likely as the stakes increased; (3) among cases that were not resolved by
evidence, plaintiffs were less likely to request an oath as the stakes
increased; and (4) among cases where the plaintiff requested an oath, the
impact of the stakes on the defendant’s decision to take an oath was
ambiguous. Our analysis contributes both to the theoretical literature on the
economics of dispute resolution, and to the historical literature on the role
of decisive oaths in resolving legal disputes, especially in Islamic societies. |
| Keywords: |
Decisive oath, law, dispute resolution, legal procedure, litigation, settlement, trial, evidence, lying, Ottoman law |
| JEL: |
D91 K10 K20 K40 N45 P48 Z12 |
| Date: |
2023–03 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2023-03&r=isf |