| By: |
Samuel Bazzi (Boston University, CEPR, BREAD);
Matthew Gudgeon (Boston University) |
| Abstract: |
Policymakers in diverse countries face the persistent challenge of managing
ethnic divisions. We argue that redrawing subnational political boundaries can
fundamentally reshape these divisions. We use a natural policy experiment in
Indonesia to show that changes in the political relevance of ethnic divisions
have significant effects on conflict in the short- to medium-run. While
redistricting along group lines can increase social stability, these gains are
undone and even reversed in newly polarized units. Electoral democracy further
amplifies these effects given the large returns to initial control of newly
created local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism. Overall, our
findings show that the ethnic divisions underlying widely-used diversity
measures are neither fixed nor exogenous and instead depend on the political
boundaries within which groups are organized. These results illustrate the
promise and pitfalls of redistricting policy in diverse countries where it is
not feasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. |
| Keywords: |
Conflict, Decentralization, Ethnic Divisions, Polarization, Political Boundaries |
| JEL: |
D72 D74 H41 H77 O13 Q34 |
| Date: |
2017–12 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2018-005&r=isf |