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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Lluís Gimeno Fabra |
| Abstract: | This work develops the concept of procedural analysis to answer essential systemic questions of patenting at an international scale. Through a novel, public procedural metric, we characterize in-depth the World’s main patent examination services. By weighing how decisions are generated, rather than just their output, we challenge past perceptions on national bias, proving that patent offices do not discriminate foreign applicants. Despite strong qualitative differences in the stringency and thoroughness of patent offices, we also measure important degrees of substitution and convergence across patent systems, leading in particular areas to surprisingly high similarities in granted scopes. |
| Keywords: | Patents; Industrial Property; Technology; Patent System; Public Administration; European Patent Law; Industrial Policy; Innovation |
| Date: | 2025–06–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/391038 |
| By: | Katrin Hussinger (DEM, Université du Luxembourg); Issah Wunnam (University of Leicester, UK) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether family ownership is associated with a preference for patents or trade secrets. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, we show that family ownership is negatively associated with patenting and positively associated with the usage of trade secrets. We further show that both relationships are moderated by firm performance below the aspiration level, i.e. the performance benchmark level that an organization sets. These results can be explained with a mixed gambles behavioral agency framework. When family firms perform below their aspiration level, prospective financial gains become relatively more important as compared to current socio emotional wealth so that patents become more and trade secrets less attractive. |
| Keywords: | Family firms, patents, trade secrets, mixed gambles, aspiration gap. |
| JEL: | O34 O32 G32 M14 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:25-11 |
| By: | Chen, Kong-Pin; Dai, Xiaoyong; Li, Kai; Lin, Pingxin |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a tournament theory to explain the year-end rush phenomenon—the pervasive surge in organizational activities or investments at period-ends. In a multi-period tournament with observable interim performance, lagging contestants exert disproportionately high effort in later periods to catch up. Because the final period is not subject to future catching-up, the marginal return to effort peaks at the end, generating an effort surge. The model predicts a monotonically increasing relationship between a contestant's interim performance rank and the extent of his year-end rush. We test these predictions using data on patent applications across Chinese cities, where official promotion is well-known to follow tournament-style competition. Our results show: (i) a robust year-end patent application surge, and (ii) a monotonic relationship between a city’s rush intensity and its interim performance rank within its province. While China’s patent growth target policy has been criticized for exacerbating year-end rushes and reducing patent quality, we demonstrate that the underlying driver is the bureaucratic tournament; growth targets merely exacerbate it. Additional evidence highlights the role of patent agencies in facilitating patent rush. |
| Keywords: | year-end rush, fourth-quarter effect, multi-stage tournament, interim relative performance, career concern, Chinese economy, Chinese patent policy |
| JEL: | D0 D04 L2 M5 M54 |
| Date: | 2025–05–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:124898 |