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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Wurster, Maximilian; Hellenkamp, Detlef |
| Abstract: | In knowledge-based economies, technological innovation capability, intangible assets, and intellectual property are becoming increasingly important for long-term economic performance. Patent data are widely used as indicators of innovation; however, simple patent counts do not adequately capture the quality, technological relevance, or international market coverage of individual patents. This paper therefore examines the extent to which key patents can serve as a quality-oriented indicator of technological innovation capability for analysing economic performance. Key patents are understood as particularly high-quality patents in relevant key technologies, whose patent strength derives from technological relevance and international market coverage. The paper combines a conceptual analysis of the key patent approach with literature from growth and innovation economics, as well as with an exploratory empirical plausibility assessment based on a global patent dataset on world-class patents in future technologies (Breitinger et al., 2020). Economic performance is operationalised empirically through per capita income. The empirical evidence is assessed from two complementary perspectives: an international cross-section of high-income economies and a dynamic analysis of the United States, which held a particularly prominent position in high-quality patenting across key future technologies during the period under observation. In both perspectives, the findings point to a positive association between key patents and per capita income. They should not, however, be interpreted as evidence of causality, but as empirically grounded support for the plausibility of this relationship. The contribution of this paper lies in positioning key patents as a differentiated innovation indicator that takes patent quality, technological relevance, and international reach more fully into account than mere patent volumes. The key patent approach thus offers a scientifically grounded perspective on innovation capability and economic performance in knowledge-based economies. |
| Keywords: | Key patents, Patent quality, Innovation indicators, Technological innovation capability, Knowledge-based economies, Economic performance, Intangible assets |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O34 O47 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:343662 |
| By: | Jacob Moscona |
| Abstract: | How do patent rights affect innovation and downstream production? Patent protection was introduced for plant biotechnology in the United States in 1985, and it affected crops differentially depending on their reproductive structures. Exploiting this unique feature of plant flower structure and a new dataset of crop-specific technology development, I find that the introduction of patent rights increased the development of novel plant varieties. Technology development was driven by a rapid increase in private sector research investment, was accompanied by positive spillover effects on innovation in certain non-biological agricultural technologies, and led to an increase in crop yields. Patent rights, however, may come with potentially significant costs to the consumers of technology and distortions to downstream production. Nevertheless, despite higher spending on seeds, US counties that were more exposed to the change in patent law because of their crop composition experienced an increase in agricultural land values and profits. Taken together, the results suggest that the prospect of patent protection spurred innovation and increased downstream productivity and profits. |
| JEL: | O3 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35735 |
| By: | Michael Devereux (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation); Ben Lockwood (University of Warwick); Erez Yerushalmi (Birmingham City University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the relative desirability of R&D tax credits (TCs) and patent boxes (PBs) as instruments for stimulating R&D, in a setting which allows for several organizational forms within the R&D sector and where there are several market failures, all of which imply under-investment in R&D. There are two key features of the model. The first is that it is a closed economy, so the (international) profit shifting role for the PB is absent. The second is that there may be an unobservable input to R&D (e.g. managerial effort) that cannot be subsidized by a TC. The government can choose a TC, a PB, and also the main rate of CIT. We find that (i) when the unobservable input is absent, a PB should never be used, but a TC may be, if market failure is severe enough; (ii) when the unobservable input is present, the optimal policy depends on the need for tax revenue, as measured by the MCPF. When this is low, the TC should never be used, but a PB may be, but as need rises, both instruments should be used, and when it is very high, only a TC should be used. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1625 |