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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Hamid Bekamiri (Aalborg University Business School, The IKE Research Group, Aalborg University, Denmark); Jan Auernhammer (Center for Design Research, ME Design Group, Stanford University, USA); Milad Abbasiharofteh (Aalborg University Business School, The IKE Research Group, Aalborg University, Denmark); Jesper Lindgaard Christensen (Aalborg University Business School, The IKE Research Group, Aalborg University, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | Green-patent indicators based on Cooperative Patent Classification Y02 tags increasingly inform research, industrial policy, and climate-oriented investment, yet their construct validity has not been evaluated at corpus scale. We ask whether Y02 classification errors are random measurement noise or systematic, direction-specific bias. We introduce an Error-as-Signal framework in which disagreement between an administrative label and an independent model is treated as evidence of potential measurement error. Screening 9, 075, 421 USPTO granted patents from 1962-2024 with a fine-tuned domain model identifies 517, 772 disagreements. Two independent open-weight large language models then assess whether each flagged invention has a direct climate-mitigation or adaptation function. Cross-model consensus identifies 180, 384 administrative Type I errors (False Green) and 29, 465 Type II errors (Silent Green). Correcting these errors reduces the measured green-patent population by 25.5%, from 592, 387 to 441, 468 patents. Misclassification is systematic rather than random. Atypicality predicts Silent Green in an inverted-U pattern, while reflection complexity independently increases under-recognition: controlling for atypicality and filing year, a one-standard-deviation increase is associated with 1.61 times the odds of Silent Green. Structural complexity has the opposite association. Among consensus-attributed errors, the same increase in reflection complexity is associated with 2.45 times the odds that an error is Silent Green rather than False Green. Event tests show no discrete rise in misclassification when green classification became more salient and only limited evidence of increased explicit green framing after the 2013 CPC launch. The evidence is more consistent with bounded classification capacity than with applicant gaming. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.23420 |
| By: | Devereux, Michael; Lockwood, Ben; Yerushalmi, Erez |
| Abstract: | We analyze the relative desirability of R&D tax credits (TCs) and patent boxes (PBs) as instruments for stimulating R&D, in a setting which allows for several organizational forms within the R&D sector and where there are several market failures, all of which imply under-investment in R&D. There are two key features of the model. The first is that it is a closed economy, so the (international) profit shifting role for the PB is absent. The second is that there may be an unobservable input to R&D (e.g. managerial effort) that cannot be subsidized by a TC. The government can choose a TC, a PB, and also the main rate of CIT. We find that (i) when the unobservable input is absent, a PB should never be used, but a TC may be, if market failure is severe enough; (ii) when the unobservable input is present, the optimal policy depends on the need for tax revenue, as measured by the MCPF. When this is low, the TC should never be used, but a PB may be, but as need rises, both instruments should be used, and when it is very high, |
| Keywords: | R&D tax credits; patent boxes; corporate income tax; innovation policy; R&D spillovers; tax incentives |
| Date: | 2026–08–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:akf:cafewp:43 |