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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Hutschenreiter, Dennis |
| Abstract: | Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know- how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter's gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable - absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created. |
| Keywords: | common ownership, institutional investors, moral hazard, patent reassignments |
| JEL: | C78 D82 G23 L24 O34 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:340107 |
| By: | Margherita Gerolimetto (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice); Stefano Magrini (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice); Alessandro Spiganti (University of Genoa) |
| Abstract: | We study the causal effect of the local supply of sector-specific innovators on patenting activity across US metropolitan areas, distinguishing between innovators active in carbon-intensive ("brown") and environmentally sustainable ("green") technological fields. Using USPTO patent data from 1990 to 2016, we document a marked shift in the geography of green innovation: while brown patenting has long been concentrated in established hubs, green patents — initially more dispersed — have increasingly converged toward the same locations. We build a theoretical framework in which local patenting activity is driven by the supply of green and brown innovators, investigating how their interaction shapes the innovation process. Empirically, we address endogeneity using a shift-share instrument that combines predetermined local technological specialization with exogenous shocks to foreign innovation across CPC sections. We find that a one-unit increase in the local supply of brown innovators raises patenting activity by approximately 0.8%, an effect that is robust across specifications. Together, these findings suggest that green innovation is becoming increasingly embedded in existing agglomeration ecosystems, with important implications for place-based climate policy. |
| Keywords: | agglomeration, climate change, innovation, spatial distribution, patents |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O44 O47 R11 R12 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2026:14 |