nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2025–06–16
three papers chosen by
Giovanni Battista Ramello, Università di Turino
  1. Patent pledge and technological innovation: the "good faith" of Tesla By Ziming Wang
  2. Acquiring Patents in Secret: Disclosure Timing in Markets for Technology By George Chondrakis; Carlos J. Serrano; Rosemarie Ziedonis
  3. Funding structure and university patenting: An analysis of European higher education institutions By Joanna Wolszczak-Derlacz; Aleksandra Parteka; Sabina Szymczak; Piotr Platkowski
  1. By: Ziming Wang
    Keywords: Patent pledge, intellectual property strategy, ecosystem, invention diffusion, electric vehicles, Tesla
    JEL: O30 O32 O34
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg2510
  2. By: George Chondrakis; Carlos J. Serrano; Rosemarie Ziedonis
    Abstract: Markets for technology provide a vibrant channel through which firms purchase ownership rights to patented inventions. Although such transactions enable firms to secure access to intangible assets originating beyond their borders, they also provide cues to competitors regarding the purchasing firm’s technological investments. This study explores the timing of strategic disclosure of patent acquisitions and the conditions under which firms trade the benefits of competitor deterrence through early recordation for those of secrecy through delayed disclosure. Using evidence on the lag between the execution and recording dates for US patents purchased by publicly traded corporations, we predict and find earlier disclosure of patent acquisitions when the buyer works on related technologies and is better positioned to enforce the patents (i.e., is large and relatively litigious). As predicted by the model, we also find that the buyer delays disclosure when the seller is a large firm, suggesting that buyers take advantage of the seller’s ability to deter competitors while keeping the transaction secret. Additional analyses reveal that (a) regulatory changes reducing the value of keeping acquisitions of patent applications secret lead to shorter recording lags, and (b) increases in the enforceability of business method and software patents further accelerate the voluntary recording of patent ownership changes. The study provides new evidence on the tradeoffs that innovating firms face when determining the timing of disclosure for patents they have purchased in technology markets.
    JEL: O3 O32 O34 O38
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33783
  3. By: Joanna Wolszczak-Derlacz (Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland); Aleksandra Parteka (Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland); Sabina Szymczak (Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland); Piotr Platkowski (Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland)
    Abstract: Relatively poor transfer of knowledge from higher education to the market remains a concern in Europe, universities being involved in at most 10% of all patented inventions. We examine the role of university funding in patenting, addressing three key research gaps: (i) the limited, country-specific samples rather than pan-European data used in most patent-funding studies; (ii) scarce evidence on the impact of the funding structure on patent quality; and (iii) the lack of precise estimates of interactions between university patenting, funding structures, and regional systems. We fill these gaps thanks to a micro-level database of almost 2, 900 higher education institutions (HEIs) in 31 European countries and 295 NUTS2 regions (2011-2019), containing detailed information on their activity as direct patent applicants and various institutional characteristics, including financial records. We show that universities with a greater share of third-party funds (research grants, contracts) apply for more patents and have better quality patents than those that rely mainly on core funding, i.e. national/regional allocations. The HEIs that do patent are richer and have more than twice the share of third-party revenues. This indicates that the very marked core-periphery pattern of university patenting in Europe is related both to the amount of university funding and to its sources. Additionally, we find that regional economic systems also influence the way in which the funding structure impacts university patenting. The positive effect of third-party funding is strongest in the wealthy European regions, less so in developed areas, and negligible in the poorest regions.
    Keywords: Patents, Higher Education Institutions, University, Funding
    JEL: O31 O34 I23
    Date: 2025–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gdk:wpaper:75
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