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on Intellectual Property Rights |
By: | Francois de Soyres; Ece Fisgin; Ana Maria Santacreu |
Abstract: | A new measure of patent similarity shows China shifting its international patents toward technology-intensive industries traditionally dominated by developed nations. |
Keywords: | China; patents; technology |
Date: | 2025–04–03 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:l00001:99789 |
By: | Jesse LaBelle (Northwestern University); Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso (Universitat Jaume I); Ana Maria Santacreu (FRB of St. Louis); Yoto Yotov (School of Economics, Drexel University) |
Abstract: | We build a model of cross-border patent filing, technology diffusion, and development. Our theory delivers a ‘structural gravity’ equation for cross-border patent flows that disentangles the effects of technology diffusion from policy-driven changes in IPR protection. To test the model’s predictions, we compile the International Patent and Citations across Sectors (INPACT-S) database that tracks patents within and between countries and industries over time. The econometric analysis reveals that while policy efforts have effectively promoted cross-border patent flows, the surge in patents from developed (North) to developing (South) countries between 1995 and 2018 was primarily driven by increased technology diffusion. A numerical analysis shows these North-South flows benefited both regions but generated larger gains in the South, thus reducing global income inequality. |
Keywords: | Cross-border Patents, Gravity, Technology Diffusion, Development, Policy. |
JEL: | F63 O14 O33 O34 |
Date: | 2025–07 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drx:wpaper:202507 |
By: | Jésus Fernández-Villaverde; Yang Yu; Francesco Zanetti; Jesús Fernández-Villaverde |
Abstract: | Defensive hiring of researchers by incumbent firms with monopsony power reduces creative destruction. This mechanism helps explain the simultaneous rise in R&D spending and decline in TFP growth in the US economy over recent decades. We develop a simple model highlighting the critical role of the inelastic supply of research labor in enabling this effect. Empirical evidence confirms that the research labor supply in the US is indeed inelastic and supports other model predictions: incumbent R&D spending is negatively correlated with creative destruction and sectoral TFP growth while extending incumbents’ lifespan. All these effects are amplified when ideas are harder to find. An extended version of the model quantifies these mechanisms’ implications for productivity, innovation, and policy. |
Keywords: | productivity growth, innovation, R&D, patents, creative destruction |
JEL: | E22 L11 O31 O33 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11753 |
By: | Arroyabe, M. F.; Grimpe, Christoph; Hussinger, Katrin |
Abstract: | We investigate whether strengthened legal protection of trade secrets increases the likelihood of a firm being acquired. Stronger protection can make a firm more attractive for acquisition due to better safeguarding of trade secrets, but it may also increase information asymmetries that discourage potential acquirers. Using the staggered implementation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in the U.S., we show that stronger trade secret protection increases the likelihood of being acquired, but also changes firms' acquisition strategies more broadly depending on the distance between acquirer and target. Compared to domestic acquirers, foreign acquirers are only half as likely to make an acquisition, and they prefer to acquire minority rather than majority stakes. Both domestic and foreign acquirers are more likely to pursue stepwise acquisitions of a target as protection increases, consistent with a real options rationale. Further investigation suggests that, while increased trade secret protection increases information asymmetries for all acquirers, foreign acquirers as well as domestic acquirers located further away from a target are disproportionately affected. |
Keywords: | trade secret protection, firm acquisitions, ownership stakes, distance, Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) |
JEL: | G34 O34 L20 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:312580 |