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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Rossana Mastrandrea (Department of Management, University of Turin, Torino, Italy); Fabio Montobbio (Dipartimento di Politica Economica, DISCE, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy – ICRIOS, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy – BRICK, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino, Italy); Gabriele Pellegrino (Dipartimento di Politica Economica, DISCE, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy); Massimo Riccaboni (IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy – IUSS, Pavia, Italy); Valerio Sterzi (Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE), University of Bordeaux, CNRS, UMR 6060, Bordeaux, France) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the roles of public and private sector actors in the development of mRNA vaccines, a breakthrough innovation in modern medicine. Using a dataset of 151 core patent fam- ilies and 2, 416 antecedent (cited) patents, we analyze the structure and dynamics of the mRNA vaccine knowledge network through network theory. Our findings highlight the central role of biotechnology firms, such as Moderna and BioNTech, alongside the crucial contributions of univer- sities and public research organizations (PROs) in providing foundational knowledge. We develop a novel credit allocation framework, showing that universities, PROs, government and research cen- ters account for at least 27% of the external technological knowledge base behind mRNA vaccine breakthroughs—representing a minimum threshold of their overall contribution. Our study offers new insights into pharmaceutical and biotechnology innovation dynamics, emphasizing how Mod- erna and BioNTech’s mRNA technologies have benefited from academic institutions, with notable differences in their institutional knowledge sources. |
| Keywords: | breakthrough innovation, innovation networks, patent analysis, mRNA vaccines, COVID- 19 |
| JEL: | I10 I18 L65 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie5:dipe0047 |
| By: | Sinda Kassab; Huan Xie |
| Abstract: | We report a laboratory experiment on dynamic patent races in an indefinite horizon with complete information. In a competitive environment, we analyze the R&D investment behavior of players who are randomly and anonymously paired in each race. We vary subjects’ initial positions as leader/follower or symmetric/asymmetric, as well as the distance between the initial knowledge stock and the target. Our results show that individual average effort is highest for players in a tie position, followed by leaders, and lowest for followers. Starting as a follower (leader) leads to a lower (higher) chance of winning the race. Spillovers realized in the previous round significantly increase players’ investment in the current round. Convergence toward equilibrium play becomes more pronounced in the second half of the sessions. Efficiency loss is significantly higher in races starting from a symmetric position than from an asymmetric position and is also significantly higher in the low treatment than in the high treatment. Nous présentons une expérience de laboratoire sur les courses aux brevets dynamiques dans un horizon indéfini avec une information complète. Dans un environnement concurrentiel, nous analysons le comportement d'investissement en R&D des joueurs qui sont appariés de manière aléatoire et anonyme dans chaque course. Nous faisons varier les positions initiales des sujets (leader/suiveur ou symétrique/asymétrique), ainsi que la distance entre le niveau de connaissance initial et la cible. Nos résultats montrent que l'effort individuel moyen est le plus élevé pour les joueurs en position d'égalité, suivis par les leaders, et le plus faible pour les suiveurs. Commencer en tant que suiveur (leader) conduit à une chance plus faible (plus élevée) de gagner la course. Les retombées réalisées lors du tour précédent augmentent de manière significative l'investissement des joueurs dans le tour en cours. La convergence vers le jeu d'équilibre devient plus prononcée dans la seconde moitié des sessions. La perte d'efficacité est significativement plus élevée dans les courses commençant à partir d'une position symétrique qu'à partir d'une position asymétrique et est également plus élevée dans le traitement faible que dans le traitement élevé. |
| Keywords: | Patent race, absorptive capacity, knowledge accumulation, efficiency loss, experimental investigation, Course aux brevets, capacité d'absorption, accumulation de connaissances, perte d'efficacité, enquête expérimentale |
| Date: | 2025–04–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2025s-08 |