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on Intellectual Property Rights |
By: | Hambur Wang |
Abstract: | This paper constructs a novel intellectual property (IP) protection strategy using differential equation theory, aiming to analyze and optimize the effectiveness of IP protection. By developing a mathematical model, it explores the dynamic impact of IP protection intensity on both innovative enterprises and infringement activities. The study finds that a well-designed IP protection strategy can effectively reduce infringement while promoting technological innovation. The paper also discusses the effects of strategies under varying parameter conditions and verifies the model's rationality and effectiveness through numerical simulation. The findings provide theoretical support and references for formulating IP protection policies. |
Date: | 2024–11 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.00981 |
By: | Kim, Jinhwan (Stanford U); Valentine, Kristen (U of Georgia) |
Abstract: | Innovative public firms sell 9.6% (615) more patents in the last month, relative to the first half of the fiscal year. Consistent with reporting incentives driving these sales, they are more pronounced among firms with strong incentives to meet earnings expectations. Patents sold in the last month are litigated more frequently because they are disproportionately sold to “patent trolls†, who opportunistically acquire patents to engage in litigation. We find anti-troll laws reduce opportunistic acquisition among trolls. We highlight a novel consequence of corporate reporting incentives: its contribution to strategic patent sales, which in turn impact the market for innovation. |
JEL: | D23 M40 M41 O30 O31 O32 O34 |
Date: | 2024–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:4162 |
By: | Dietmar Harhoff; David Heller; Paul P. Momtaz |
Abstract: | We show that firm and industry, rather than inventor and invention factors, explain more than half of the variation in inventor returns in administrative employer-inventor-patent-linked data from Germany. Between-firm variation in inventive rents is strongly associated with inventor mobility. Inventors are more likely to make a move just before a patent is filed than shortly thereafter and benefit from their move through a mobility-related marginal inventor return. Employers that pay inventor returns in excess of the expected return gain a favorable position in the market for inventive labor with subsequent increases in patent quality and quantity. Consistent with theoretical arguments, effect sizes also depend on employer-inventor technological complementarity, degree of competition, and invention quality. |
Keywords: | inventor returns, labor mobility, patents, inventive productivity |
JEL: | O31 J24 J62 |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11449 |