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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Langinier, Corinne (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Even after final rejection, patent applications are never completely rejected. In the U.S., a patent applicant can reapply after a final rejection by submitting amended applications called continuations. While patent applicants benefit from this procedure (a final rejection is never final), examiners are worse off when examining continuations than when reviewing new applications. We theoretically investigate the impact of continuation on the patenting process. We find that the continuation process introduces a trade-off for examiners: a reduction in the initial applications' examination intensity can compensate for the loss incurred due to continuation in the case of rejection. Thus, examiners reduce their examination efforts when uncertainty about the innovation's patentability is the highest. When innovations are more likely to be patentable, examiners tend to grant patents after little scrutiny, reducing the chance of encountering continuations later on. Abolishing continuing applications could restore examiners' incentives to perform thorough evaluations of patent applications. |
| Keywords: | Patents; Examiners; Continuation |
| JEL: | D23 D86 O34 |
| Date: | 2024–10–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2024_006 |
| By: | Langinier, Corinne (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita (University of Winnipeg) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the impact of patent policies and emission taxes on green innovation. We allow for strategic interactions of firms in a duopolistic market in the presence of green conscious consumers. We identify a paradoxical effect of increasing emission taxes beyond a certain threshold which results in an increase in emissions. Decreasing patenting costs mitigates this paradox, while the impact of tightening patentability requirements is more complex. Moreover, we show that the greater the proportion of green-conscious consumers, the less likely firms are to license a green patent, which results in higher emissions levels. With green consumers, the lowest emissions occur for an intermediate range of taxes for which licensing does occur. Finally, we find that while tax increases lead to a switch from overinvestment to underinvestment in the absence of green conscious consumers, they have the reverse effect in their presence. |
| Keywords: | Patent; Green Innovation; Pollution |
| JEL: | L13 O34 Q50 |
| Date: | 2024–10–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2024_007 |