nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2024‒05‒27
two papers chosen by
Giovanni Battista Ramello, Università di Turino


  1. Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets By Brian Love; Yassine Lefouili; Christian Helmers
  2. Patents as business diplomacy tools By Hugo Spring-Ragain

  1. By: Brian Love (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Yassine Lefouili (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Christian Helmers (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) "hold-up" companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77% of SEP and 65% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee's loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35% of SEP assertions vs. 10% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee's litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8%) and non-SEP assertions (6%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee's litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probability of settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee's loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement.
    Keywords: Litigation, Standards, Patents, Holdup, U.S
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04547832&r=ipr
  2. By: Hugo Spring-Ragain (HEIP - Hautes Etudes Internationales et Politiques, Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégique)
    Abstract: This article examines the role of patents in contemporary economic diplomacy, highlighting their growing importance in international negotiations and trade relations. Patents are defined as key intellectual property instruments allowing companies and research centers to protect their innovations and obtain a temporary monopoly on their exploitation. International patent cooperation is explored through agreements such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which facilitates the filing of international patents, and the European Patent Convention (EPC), which harmonizes procedures. deposit in Europe. Co-patents and triadic patents are also analyzed as forms of cooperation between companies and between states. The case of COVID-19 is used as a concrete example to illustrate patent diplomacy, highlighting both cooperation and competition between states in the development and distribution of vaccines. Despite international cooperation, diplomatic tensions and commercial rivalries have emerged, particularly between Western and Eastern countries. Patents have played a central role in these issues, with debates over lifting patents to ensure equitable access to vaccines.
    Abstract: Cet article examine le rôle des brevets dans la diplomatie économique contemporaine, mettant en lumière leur importance croissante dans les négociations internationales et les relations commerciales. Les brevets sont définis comme des instruments clés de propriété intellectuelle permettant aux entreprises et aux centres de recherche de protéger leurs innovations et d'obtenir un monopole temporaire sur leur exploitation. La coopération internationale en matière de brevets est explorée à travers des accords tels que le Traité de Coopération en matière de Brevets (PCT), qui facilite le dépôt de brevets internationaux, et la Convention sur le Brevet Européen (CBE), qui harmonise les procédures de dépôt en Europe. Les co-brevets et les brevets triadiques sont également analysés comme des formes de coopération entre entreprises et entre États. Le cas du COVID-19 est utilisé comme exemple concret pour illustrer la diplomatie des brevets, mettant en évidence à la fois la coopération et la concurrence entre les États dans le développement et la distribution des vaccins. Malgré la coopération internationale, des tensions diplomatiques et des rivalités commerciales ont émergé, notamment entre les pays occidentaux et orientaux. Les brevets ont joué un rôle central dans ces enjeux, avec des débats sur la levée des brevets pour assurer un accès équitable aux vaccins.
    Keywords: Brevets, Economie, Diplomatie
    Date: 2024–04–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04540636&r=ipr

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