nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2024‒04‒29
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Battista Ramello, Università di Turino

  1. The Propensity for Patenting in the Italian Regions By Leogrande, Angelo
  2. The interplay between innovation, standards and regulation in a globalising economy By Blind, Knut; Münch, Florian
  3. How Does Expropriation Risk Affect Innovation? By Jose-Miguel Benavente; Claudio Bravo-Ortega; Pablo Egaña-delSol; Bronwyn H. Hall
  4. Optimal Auction Design with Flexible Royalty Payments By Ian Ball; Teemu Pekkarinen

  1. By: Leogrande, Angelo
    Abstract: In this article I analyzed the propensity for patenting in Italian regions through the use of ISTAT-BES data. The static analysis shows the presence of a significant gap between the northern regions and the southern regions in the period between 2004 and 2019. The econometric analysis applied with panel models highlights the relationships that the propensity to patent has with respect to the determinants of innovation systems at regional level. The results are critically discussed with economic policy recommendations.
    Keywords: Innovation, Innovation and Invention, Management of Technological Innovation and R&D, Technological Change, Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    JEL: O30 O31 O32 O33 O34
    Date: 2024–03–24
  2. By: Blind, Knut; Münch, Florian
    Abstract: To examine the different roles of regulation and standards in the age of globalisation, we hypothesize and investigate the relation of regulation and national and international standards on the one hand with innovation input (R&D expenditure) and innovation output (patents) on the other hand. The analysis is based on data of 26 high-income countries between 1998 and 2018. There are two main results. Firstly, international standards outperform both de-regulation and national standardisation as they are positively associated with R&D expenditure and patenting. On the other hand, national standards – once believed a source of competitiveness – are negatively related to patents and hence seem to localize economies and slow-down innovation. Secondly, de-regulation does not correlate positively with R&D expenditure, but with increased patenting. We argue the former suggest businesses did not – as assumed – spend freed up resources on R&D, but instead strategically used patenting to replace lost regulation-based protection with patent fences. This casts doubts on the added social value of de-regulation induced innovation.
    Keywords: globalization; innovation; patents; R&D; regulation; standardization
    JEL: R14 J01 N0
    Date: 2024–03–15
  3. By: Jose-Miguel Benavente; Claudio Bravo-Ortega; Pablo Egaña-delSol; Bronwyn H. Hall
    Abstract: We analyze how expropriation risk reduces incentives for innovation and reallocates resources from the innovative sector, building on Romer’s(1990) model. Our framework predicts the R&D expenditure, the share of human capital in R&D, the number of patents, technical progress, and economic growth are all lower due to lower expected profits and patent devaluation in the presence of expropriation risks. Empirical analyses, based on a LASSO Instrumental Variable approach and a novel comprehensive dataset spanning nearly two decades, confirm our theoretical predictions. We find robust evidence that expropriation risk, such as corruption, negatively impacts innovation by reducing R&D expenditure, human capital in R&D, number of patents, scientific publications, and the Economic Complexity Index, which is our proxy for technical progress. These findings highlight the detrimental effects of expropriation risk on innovation and economic development at the country level.
    JEL: O17 O30 O50
    Date: 2024–03
  4. By: Ian Ball; Teemu Pekkarinen
    Abstract: We study the design of an auction for a license. Each agent has a signal about his future profit from winning the license. If the license is allocated, the winner can be charged a flexible royalty based on the profits he reports. The principal can audit the winner, at a cost, and charge limited penalties. We solve for the auction that maximizes revenue, net auditing costs. In this auction, the winner pays linear royalties up to a cap, beyond which there is no auditing. A more optimistic bidder pays more upfront in exchange for a lower royalty cap.
    Date: 2024–03

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