|
on Intellectual Property Rights |
Issue of 2022‒09‒19
five papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara; Paillacar, Rodrigo |
Abstract: | The paper proposes an empirical analysis of the determinants of the adoption of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and their impact on innovation in manufac- turing. The analysis is conducted with panel data covering 112 countries. First we show that IPR protection is U-shaped with respect to a country’s market size and inverse-U-shaped with respect to the aggregated market size of its trade partners. Second, reinforcing IPR protection reduces on-the-frontier and inside-the-frontier innovation in developing countries, without necessarily increasing innovation at the global level. |
Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights; Innovation; Developing Countries; Market Potential; Trade |
JEL: | F12 F13 F15 L13 O31 O34 |
Date: | 2022–09–02 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:127263&r= |
By: | Bracht, Felix; Czarnitzki, Dirk |
Abstract: | We investigate how intangible capital in form of intellectual property, such as patents, might mitigate financing constraints. While scholars have already argued that patents might have a signalling value reducing information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, we quantify the value of using patents as collateral with regard to capital access. Although this mechanism of patents in financing further R&D is not new, we are the first to provide a treatment effects study of patent collateral and access to capital. We make use of mandatory collateral registry data in Sweden and the Netherlands to construct panels combining firm-level financial data and patent measures. Estimating conditional difference-in-difference regressions on firms' debt allows deducting treatment effects of using patents as collateral. We find that patent pledging enables Swedish (Dutch) firms to borrow about 21% (26%) more than in the counterfactual situation in which no patents would have been used as collateral. We also find that the collateral value of patents is higher than their signalling value, and a back-of-the-envelope scenario calculation shows that Dutch (Swedish) firms could raise more than € 7 (€ 10) billion additional debt capital if the complete patent portfolios would be pledged, all else constant. |
Keywords: | Financing Constraints,Collateral,Intangible Assets,Patents,Treatment Effects Estimation |
JEL: | O30 O34 G31 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22033&r= |
By: | Mohd Shadab Danish; Pritam Ranjan; Ruchi Sharma |
Abstract: | This study assesses the degree to which the social value of patents can be connected to the private value of patents across discrete and complex innovation. The underlying theory suggests that the social value of cumulative patents is less related to the private value of patents. We use the patents applied between 1995 to 2002 and granted on or before December 2018 from the Indian Patent Office (IPO). Here the patent renewal information is utilized as a proxy for the private value of the patent. We have used a variety of logit regression model for the impact assessment analysis. The results reveal that the technology classification (i.e., discrete versus complex innovations) plays an important role in patent value assessment, and some technologies are significantly different than the others even within the two broader classifications. Moreover, the non-resident patents in India are more likely to have a higher value than the resident patents. According to the conclusions of this study, only a few technologies from the discrete and complex innovation categories have some private value. There is no evidence that patent social value indicators are less useful in complicated technical classes than in discrete ones. |
Date: | 2022–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2208.07222&r= |
By: | Antelo, Manel; Bru, Lluís |
Abstract: | In a differentiated Stackelberg duopoly, we explore the licensing behaviour of an inside patent holder owning a cost-reducing innovation and that may play as a leader or follower in setting the output level in the marketplace. We find that, regardless of whether the licensor is the leader or the follower, the licensing contract always involves royalties: per-unit or ad-valorem (depending on the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation) when the licensor is the leading firm, and per-unit royalties (alone or combined with a fixed payment) when it is the follower. We also show that, as compared to the pre-licensing context, licensing by a market follower is never welfare reducing, and licensing by a market leader is only welfare reducing when the products are very close substitutes. |
Keywords: | Stackelberg industry, licensing, differentiated products, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties, welfare |
JEL: | L13 L24 |
Date: | 2022–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:114181&r= |
By: | Ashish Arora; Wesley M. Cohen; Honggi Lee; Divya Sebastian |
Abstract: | Do large firms produce more valuable inventions, and if so, why? After confirming that large firms indeed produce more valuable inventions, we consider two possible sources: a superior ability to invent, or a superior ability to extract value from their inventions. We develop a simple model that discriminates between the two explanations. Using a sample of 2,786 public corporations, and measures of both patent quality and patent value, we find that, while average invention value rises with size, average invention quality declines, suggesting, per our model, that the large firm advantage is not due to superior inventive capability, but due to the superior ability to extract value. We provide evidence suggesting that this superior ability to extract value is due to greater commercialization capabilities of larger firms. |
JEL: | O31 O32 O33 O34 |
Date: | 2022–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30354&r= |