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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2021‒10‒25
one paper chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, 1, Esplanade de l’Université, 31080 Toulouse, Cedex 06, France); Yassine Lefouili (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, 1, Esplanade de l’Université, 31080 Toulouse, Cedex 06, France); Leonardo Madio (University of Padova, Department of Economics and Management, Via del Santo, 33, 35139 Padova, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We study an e-commerce platform's incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of introducing a liability regime that induces the platform to increase its screening intensity. We identify conditions under which platform liability is socially desirable (respectively, undesirable) by analyzing its intended and unintended effects on the innovation incentives of brand owners. We show that making the platform liable for the presence of IP-infringing products can lead to a reduction (instead of an increase) in brand owners' innovation if the platform responds to more screening by raising its commission rate. We then consider various extensions that allow us to identify additional forces that strengthen (respectively, weaken) the social desirability of liability. We conclude by presenting some implications for policymakers. |
| Keywords: | Platforms, Platform Liability, Intellectual Property, Innovation, Delisting |
| JEL: | L13 L43 L96 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2105&r= |