nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2021‒05‒10
two papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. BERT based freedom to operate patent analysis By Michael Freunek; Andr\'e Bodmer
  2. Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods By Asker, John; Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok

  1. By: Michael Freunek; Andr\'e Bodmer
    Abstract: In this paper we present a method to apply BERT to freedom to operate patent analysis and patent searches. According to the method, BERT is fine-tuned by training patent descriptions to the independent claims. Each description represents an invention which is protected by the corresponding claims. Such a trained BERT could be able to identify or order freedom to operate relevant patents based on a short description of an invention or product. We tested the method by training BERT on the patent class G06T1/00 and applied the trained BERT on five inventions classified in G06T1/60, described via DOCDB abstracts. The DOCDB abstract are available on ESPACENET of the European Patent Office.
    Date: 2021–04
  2. By: Asker, John; Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok
    Abstract: Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions per se can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. We show that limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments.
    Keywords: asymmetric auctions; Club goods; Intellectual Property; patents
    JEL: D44 D47 K1 L14
    Date: 2021–01

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