nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2021‒01‒11
five papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. The Missing 15 Percent of Patent Citations By Cyril Verluise; Gabriele Cristelli; Kyle Higham; Gaetan de Rassenfosse
  2. Trademark filings and patent application count time series are structurally near-identical and cointegrated: Implications for studies in innovation By Iraj Daizadeh
  3. The Revision of the Canadian Copyright Act: An Economic Analysis By Marcel Boyer
  4. Do Stronger Patents Lead to Faster Innovation? The Effect of Duplicative Search By Kaustav Das; Nicolas Klein
  5. Subsidies or Tax Breaks Versus Intellectual Property Rights: Dual Markets By Skliaustyte, Egle; Weber, Matthias

  1. By: Cyril Verluise (Collège de France); Gabriele Cristelli (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne); Kyle Higham (Hitotsubashi University); Gaetan de Rassenfosse (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne)
    Abstract: Patent citations are one of the most commonly-used metrics in the innovation literature. Leading uses of patent-to-patent citations are associated with the quantification of inventions’ quality and the measurement of knowledge flows. Due to their widespread availability, scholars have exploited citations listed on the front-page of patent documents. Citations appearing in the full-text of patent documents have been neglected. We apply modern machine learning methods to extract these citations from the text of USPTO patent documents. Overall, we are able to recover an additional 15 percent of patent citations that could not be found using only front-page data. We show that in-text citations bring a different type of information compared to front-page citations. They exhibit higher text-similarity to the citing patents and alter the ranking of patent importance. The dataset is available at (CC-BY-4).
    Keywords: Citation; Patent; Open data
    JEL: C81 O30
    Date: 2020–12
  2. By: Iraj Daizadeh
    Abstract: Through time series analysis, this paper empirically explores, confirms and extends the trademark/patent inter-relationship as proposed in the normative intellectual-property (IP)-oriented Innovation Agenda view of the science and technology (S&T) firm. Beyond simple correlation, it is shown that trademark-filing (Trademarks) and patent-application counts (Patents) have similar (if not, identical) structural attributes (including similar distribution characteristics and seasonal variation, cross-wavelet synchronicity/coherency (short-term cross-periodicity) and structural breaks) and are cointegrated (integration order of 1) over a period of approximately 40 years (given the monthly observations). The existence of cointegration strongly suggests a "long-run" equilibrium between the two indices; that is, there is (are) exogenous force(s) restraining the two indices from diverging from one another. Structural breakpoints in the chrono-dynamics of the indices supports the existence of potentially similar exogeneous forces(s), as the break dates are simultaneous/near-simultaneous (Trademarks: 1987, 1993, 1999, 2005, 2011; Patents: 1988, 1994, 2000, and 2011). A discussion of potential triggers (affecting both time series) causing these breaks, and the concept of equilibrium in the context of these proxy measures are presented. The cointegration order and structural co-movements resemble other macro-economic variables, stoking the opportunity of using econometrics approaches to further analyze these data. As a corollary, this work further supports the inclusion of trademark analysis in innovation studies. Lastly, the data and corresponding analysis tools (R program) are presented as Supplementary Materials for reproducibility and convenience to conduct future work for interested readers.
    Date: 2020–12
  3. By: Marcel Boyer
    Abstract: A clause of the 2012 Canadian Copyright Modernization Act requires Parliament to review the Copyright Act every five years. The House of Commons instructed two of its committees, the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (INDU) and the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (SCCH), to review the Copyright Act. The committees filed their reports in 2019. Four of their recommendations are particularly relevant and discussed here: the extension of the term of copyright, the introduction of a so-called “termination right”, an amendment of the copyright reversion regime, and the introduction of a mandatory registration. My study is intended to inform policy analysis of these recommendations, including, among other things, the upfront impact on creator bargaining power and remuneration; the long-term impact on a work’s availability and potential revenues; the creative marketplace in general; and the interactions between the proposed legislative amendments and other areas of the Copyright Act.
    Keywords: Copyright Term Extension,Copyright Termination Right,Copyright Reversion Regime,Creators Remuneration,Bargaining Power,Risk and Discounting,
    Date: 2020–12–21
  4. By: Kaustav Das; Nicolas Klein
    Abstract: We analyse a model of two firms that are engaged in a patent race. Firms have to choose in continuous time between a traditional and an innovative method of pursuing the decisive breakthrough. They share a common belief about the likelihood of the innovative method being good. The unique Markov perfect equilibrium coincides with the cartel solution if and only if firms are symmetric in their abilities of leveraging a good innovative method or there is no patent protection. Otherwise, equilibrium will entail excessive duplication of efforts in the innovative method, as compared to the cartel benchmark, for any level of patent protection. We show that the expected time to a breakthrough is minimised at an interior level of patent protection, providing a possible explanation for the decrease in R&D productivity sometimes associated with stronger patent protections.
    Keywords: R&D competition, Duplication, Two-armed Bandit, Learning
    JEL: C73 D83 O31
    Date: 2020–03
  5. By: Skliaustyte, Egle; Weber, Matthias (University of St. Gallen)
    Abstract: Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest to use rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a way of providing incentives to originators that is easy to implement. This is possible if there is an additional market in which the originator operates, where copying is not easily possible. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies or tax breaks in the market for live performances. We provide a modeling framework that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving or even pareto efficient.
    Date: 2021–01–04

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