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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2020‒07‒27
five papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Martin Wörter (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Michael Peneder (Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Vienna, Austria); Mark Thompson (Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria) |
| Abstract: | We test whether intellectual property rights (IPRs) foster or hinder innovation by estimating IV structural equations for a large sample of Swiss firms. We find that better appropriability conditions at the industry level raise the number of competitors. However, conditional on the given industry structure, individual firms face fewer competitors, if they actually use IPRs. The further impact of fewer competitors is to raise R&D, when initial competition is strong, but to reduce it, when initial competition is weak (“inverted U†). |
| Keywords: | patents, innovation, competition, simultaneous system |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O34 D22 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kof:wpskof:19-454&r=all |
| By: | Bolatto, Stefano; Naghavi, Alireza; Ottaviano, Gianmarco; Zajc Kejzar, Katja |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces the concept of intangible assets in a property rights model of sequential supply chains. Firms transmit knowledge to their suppliers to facilitate input customization. Yet, to avoid knowledge dissipation, they must protect the transmitted intangibles, the cost of which depends on the knowledge intensity of inputs and the quality of institutions protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in supplier locations. When input knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream and suppliers' investments are complements, the probability of integrating a randomly selected input is decreasing (increasing) in IPR quality and increasing (decreasing) in the relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs. Opposite but weaker predictions hold when suppliers' investments are substitutes. Comprehensive trade and FDI data on Slovenian firms' value chains provide evidence in support of our model's predictions. They also suggest that, in line with our model, better institutions may have very different effects on firm organization depending on whether they improve the protection of tangible or intangible assets. |
| Keywords: | Appropriability; firm organization; intangible assets; Intellectual Property; Outsourcing; sequential production; Stage complementarity; Upstreamness; vertical integration |
| JEL: | D23 F12 F14 F21 F23 L22 L23 L24 O34 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14256&r=all |
| By: | Marxen, Annabelle; Montez, João |
| Abstract: | We study the incentives for a monopoly incumbent to reach an agreement allowing a generic to enter just before its patent expires, i.e., at the patent cliff, and its consumer and social welfare effects. In our model, entry by more than one entrant is unprofitable. Thus, in the absence of an agreement, the entry game has a "grab the dollar" structure, with each generic entering in each period with a low (high) probability if entry costs are high (low). In that case the incumbent can remain a monopolist for some time after patent expiry, until one or more generics finally enter. An early entry agreement guarantees a single generic enters the market immediately, and it allows the incumbent to extract the entrant's profit. It will be reached in equilibrium when entry costs are low or the entry process is short. In these instances, early entry agreements do however tend to hurt consumers. Yet, allowing for such agreements increases overall social welfare in a benchmark model of vertical differentiation, even if the expected competition on the market is reduced. The same holds in a benchmark model with captive consumers and shoppers, provided the share of captives is not too high. |
| JEL: | I1 L1 L4 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14276&r=all |
| By: | Michal Krawczyk (University of Warsaw; Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE)); Joanna Tyrowicz (Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE); University of Warsaw; Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Union (IAAEU); Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)); Wojciech Hardy |
| Abstract: | Over the past decade or so, the literature has sprung in analyses of the impact the so-called online or digital "piracy" has on sales. Since theory posits both positive and negative effects are possible, the question remains purely empirical. Consequently, there is a variety of published articles and working papers arguing in both ways, many of which attempt to account for the challenge of providing a reliable and causal effect. The objective of this survey is to review and discuss the accomplishments of the field so far. We also provide a tentative meta-analysis. Despite the multiplicity of measures and methods used we argue that the literature as a whole fails to reject the null hypothesis of no effects on sales. |
| Keywords: | online piracy, ethical judgment, vignette experiment |
| JEL: | P45 P52 C14 O16 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fme:wpaper:45&r=all |
| By: | Horn, Henrik |
| Abstract: | Standards often require the use of patented technologies. Holders of standard-essential patents (SEPs) typically commit to make their patents available on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms. National competition authorities increasingly intervene against perceived FRAND violations. But which competition authority should regulate SEPs that affect more than one country? The paper uses a very simple economic framework to assess the impact of three main legal bases for allocating jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, and cross-border effects. The findings are negative: neither base will implement a jointly efficient outcome, and the relative performance of the bases depends on the particular circumstances at hand. |
| Keywords: | Default rules; international jurisdiction; Standard-essential patents |
| JEL: | F15 K21 K33 L40 O38 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14297&r=all |