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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2020‒03‒09
five papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Charlotta Olofsson; Lars Persson |
| Abstract: | Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms’ inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such “acquisitions for sleep” can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does. |
| Keywords: | acquisitions, innovation, sleeping patents, IP law, ownership |
| JEL: | G24 L10 L20 M13 O30 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8095&r=all |
| By: | Athreye, Suma (Essex Business School); Fassio, Claudio (CIRCLE, Lund University); Roper, Stephen (Warwick Business School) |
| Abstract: | In order to observe a patent application at the firm level two conditions need to be met: new products need to be of patentable quality, which depends both on the degree of novelty of innovations and on the total number (portfolio) of innovations; and the benefits of patents need to be higher than the costs of owning them. Analyzing the patent propensity of small and large UK firms using a novel innovation-level survey (the SIPU survey) linked to Community Innovation Survey data we find that when we consider the whole innovation portfolio smaller firms do patent less than larger firms. However, using data on individual innovations, we find that smaller firms are no less likely to patent any specific innovation than larger firms. We argue that size differences in the probability to patent relate primarily to the ‘portfolio effect’, i.e. larger firms generate more innovations than smaller firms and therefore are more likely to create one or more which are patentable. As for the decision to patent a patentable innovation, we find that cost barriers, more than issues of innovation quality or enforceability, deter small firms from patenting specific innovations. Measures to address the costs of patenting for smaller firms – perhaps by considering patents as eligible costs for R&D tax credits – and/or subsidizing SMEs’ participation in IP litigation schemes may both encourage patent use by smaller firms. |
| Keywords: | Patenting; SME; small firms; UK |
| JEL: | O32 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2020–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2020_002&r=all |
| By: | Bryan Harcy; Can Sever |
| Abstract: | Financial crises are accompanied by permanent drops in economic growth and output. Technological progress and innovation are important drivers of economic growth. This paper studies how financial crises affect innovative activities. Using cross-country panel data on patenting at the industry-level, we identify a financial channel whereby disruptions in financial markets impact patenting activity. Specifically, we find that patenting decreases more following banking crises for industries that are more dependent on external finance. This financial channel is not at play during currency crises, sovereign debt crises, or recessions more generally, suggesting that disruption in banking activity matters for investment in innovative activities. The effect on patenting is economically large and long-lasting, resulting in less patenting, in terms of both total quantity and quality, for 10 years or longer after a banking crisis. The average patent quality, however, does not appear to decline. We show the results are not likely to be driven by reverse causality or omitted variables. These findings provide a link between banking crises and the observed patterns of lower long-term growth. Liquidity support in the aftermath of banking crises appears to help reduce the effects through the financial channel over the short term. |
| Keywords: | innovation, financial crises, banking crises, patents, growth |
| JEL: | E44 F30 G15 G21 O31 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bis:biswps:846&r=all |
| By: | Michael Fritsch (Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), Germany.); Michael Wyrwich (University of Groningen, The Netherlands and Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany.) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the geographic concentration of patenting in large cities using a sample of 14 developed countries. There is wide dispersion of the share of patented inventions in large metropolitan areas. South Korea and the US are two extreme outliers where patenting is highly concentrated in large cities. We do not find any general trend that there is a geographic concentration of patents for the period 2000-2014. There is also no general trend that inventors in large cities have more patents than in rural areas (scaling). Hence, while agglomeration economies of large cities may offer advantages for innovation activities, the extent of these advantages is not very large. We conclude that popular theories over-emphasize the importance of large cities for innovation activities. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, patents, cities, urban scaling, creativity |
| JEL: | R12 O57 |
| Date: | 2020–02–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2020-003&r=all |
| By: | M. Huysmans |
| Abstract: | A key objective of EU trade policy is to obtain wider protection for its regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). While the WTO imposes a minimum level of protection, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red line in recent trade agreements. In the EU, trade agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval. Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article provides and analyzes new data on GI protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic considerations and political mechanisms shape and enable EU policy exports |
| Keywords: | Trade agreements, Geographical Indications, Intellectual Property, TRIPS, European Union |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1926&r=all |