nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2018‒08‒20
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Should There Be Lower Taxes on Patent Income? By Fabian Gaessler; Bronwyn H. Hall; Dietmar Harhoff
  2. Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements: Collusion versus Entry Deterrence By Jay Pil Choi; Heiko Gerlach
  3. Past and Future Research Trends of Regional Brands with Accent to Technology By Michal Stoklasa; Eva Pitrunová
  4. Intellectual Monopoly in Global Value Chains By Cédric Durand; William Milberg

  1. By: Fabian Gaessler; Bronwyn H. Hall; Dietmar Harhoff
    Abstract: A “patent box” is a term for the application of a lower corporate tax rate to the income derived from the ownership of patents. This tax subsidy instrument has been introduced in a number of countries since 2000. Using comprehensive data on patent filings at the European Patent Office, including information on ownership transfers pre- and post-grant, we investigate the impact of the introduction of a patent box on international patent transfers, on the choice of ownership location, and on invention in the relevant country. We find that the impact on transfers is small but present, especially when the tax instrument contains a development condition and for high value patents (those most likely to have generated income), but that invention itself is not affected. This calls into question whether the patent box is an effective instrument for encouraging innovation in a country, rather than simply facilitating the shifting of corporate income to low tax jurisdictions.
    JEL: H25 H32 K34 O34
    Date: 2018–07
  2. By: Jay Pil Choi; Heiko Gerlach
    Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show that a positive cross-licensing royalty rate, which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome, dulls incentives to litigate against entrants. Our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross-licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry-deterrence mechanism.
    Keywords: cross-licensing arrangements, patent litigation, collusion, entry deterrence
    JEL: D43 L13 O30
    Date: 2018
  3. By: Michal Stoklasa (Department of Business Economics and Management, School of Business Administration, Silesian University); Eva Pitrunová (Department of Business Economics and Management, School of Business Administration, Silesian University)
    Abstract: The main aim of this article is to examine the past and current research trends of regional brands, with great emphasis on the influence of technology, which will allow us to define areas for further research. The main basis for this article are secondary data, meaning other research from prestigious databases, such as Web of Science and SCOPUS, on which authors will try to describe the past and current research trends. Authors also take into account their previous vast research on this topic. There is also a need to find suitable brand model. The technology will be examined from the perspective of the technology acceptance model. This will lead to a discussion about the areas that need to be researched in the future. This article will thus serve as the cornerstone for years-long research programme
    Keywords: Regional brand, technology, Aaker`s brand model, Technology acceptance model, product characteristics
    JEL: M31
    Date: 2018–07–30
  4. By: Cédric Durand (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); William Milberg
    Date: 2018–07–27

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