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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2017‒08‒06
five papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Apurva Dey (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Arun Kumar Kaushik (O.P. Jindal Global University); Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes interdependencies between optimal trade policy and preferred' liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic, in a model of import competition between a foreign patentee and a domestic infringer. It shows two reversal results. First, a regime switch from protectionism to free trade reverses stakeholders' preferences over liability doctrines. In the free trade regime both the infringer and consumers prefer the `unjust enrichment' rule, while the patentee prefers the `lost profit' rule, over any convex combination of these two liability doctrines. In contrast, in the regime of trade policy intervention, the importing country's government prefers the `lost profit' rule, which best protects interests of the infringer at the expense of both consumers and the patentee. Second, the optimal trade policy changes from an import tariff under the `lost profit' rule to import subsidization under the `unjust enrichment' rule, unless the patent is weak. |
| Keywords: | Probabilistic intellectual property rights; Infringement; Damage rules; Import competition; Trade policy |
| JEL: | O34 L13 K40 F13 |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2017-004&r=ipr |
| By: | Rudi Bekkers; Christian Catalini; Arianna Martinelli; Cesare Righi; Timothy Simcoe |
| Abstract: | Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) require participants to disclose patents that might be infringed by implementing a proposed standard, and commit to license their “essential” patents on terms that are at least fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Data from these SSO intellectual property disclosures have been used in academic studies to provide a window into the standard setting process, and in legal proceedings to assess parties’ relative contributions to a standard. We develop a simple model of the disclosure process to illustrate the link between SSO rules and patent-holder incentives, and examine some of the model’s predictions using a novel dataset constructed from the disclosure archives of thirteen major SSOs. The central message of the paper is that subtle differences in the rules used by different SSOs can influence which patents are disclosed, the terms of licensing commitments, and ultimately long-run citation and litigation rates for the underlying patents. |
| JEL: | D22 K2 K21 L15 L17 L24 L63 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23627&r=ipr |
| By: | Jorge Britto (UFF, Brazil); Leonardo Costa Ribeiro (Inmetro, Brazil); Lucas Araújo (UFF, Brazil); Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque (CEDEPLAR/UFMG, Brazil) |
| Abstract: | In a knowledge economy, the creation, distribution and use of knowledge become decisive factors to reinforce firms' competitiveness. At the firm level, the process of innovation involves, fundamentally, the creation of new knowledge, which implies the integration and recombination of existing knowledge that may come from different sources and locations. The analytical difficulties to deal with this subject generate a literature that tries to quantify and analyze knowledge flows between economic agents using patent citations. Those citations may provide clues for intra and inter-firms knowledge flows. The paper analyses information about patents granted by IBM in the USPTO, which is used to map knowledge flows and to correlate these flows with the evolution of IBM competences and growth strategies. |
| Keywords: | Patent Citations; Knowledge flows; Firms Competences, IBM Competences; IBM Strategy |
| JEL: | O32 O34 O39 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td561&r=ipr |
| By: | Arun, Korhan; Yıldırım, Durmuş Çağrı |
| Abstract: | As innovative firms have considerable competitive advantage; more foreign direct investment (FDI) research has been related to the innovation. The primary aim of this study is to explore how intra-regional economies interact with host countries’ innovative performance, and how they are affected by FDI. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, located in the South Caucasus region, are selected as examples. Numbers of patent applications, R&D expenditure (% of GDP), and intellectual property payments are chosen as factors indicative of innovation. While this research tries to explore whether these three countries, connected by large trades, can act as a clustered group; Panel cointegration and Panel OLS models are used for analysis. The results show that FDI is an important variable affecting the level of innovation in the panel analysis. Nevertheless, individual relationships with FDI vary, and cointegration analysis shows heterogeneity. That is, foreign direct investment could play a central role in increasing the level of innovation for Azerbaijan and Georgia, but it is not an important determinant of Turkey's economic innovation level. Countries should realize that when their economies are becoming stronger, FDI is not a useful tool for escalating innovation, rather they should be in clusters that can leverage innovation. |
| Keywords: | Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Innovation, Panel Data Analysis, Panel OLS, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia |
| JEL: | F21 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80470&r=ipr |
| By: | Banerjee, Swapnendu; Poddar, Sougata |
| Abstract: | Abstract Study of patent licensing in spatial competition is relatively sparse. We study optimal licensing policies of an outside innovator in spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. We also introduce the notion of selling the property rights of innovation. We then examine the incentive of the innovator who sell the rights and compare that with conventional licensing contracts. We address this problem in linear city with two competing asymmetric firms (potential licensees). We show the optimal licensing policy is pure royalty to both firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small, otherwise it is fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling innovation to one of the firms. This holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of pre-innovation cost asymmetry between the firms. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing. |
| Keywords: | Outside innovator, Cost-reducing innovation, Patent Licensing, Patent Selling, Welfare, Linear city model |
| JEL: | D43 D45 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80432&r=ipr |