nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2017‒01‒08
five papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Contracting for technology transfer: patent licensing and know-how in Brazil By Martinez, Catalina; Zuniga, Pluvia
  2. Optimal Licensing of Non-Drastic and (Super-)Drastic Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder By Cuihong Fan; Byoung Heon Jun; Elmar G. Wolfstetter
  3. Firm patenting activity, metropolitan innovative environment and their effects on business survival in a high-tech industry By Tsvetkova, Alexandra; Thill, Jean-Claude; Conroy, Tessa
  4. Patent buyout in a model of endogenous growth By Radhakrishnan, Ravi
  5. A replication of four quasi-experiments and three facts from 'The effect of file sharing on record sales: an empirical analysis' (Journal of Political Economy, 2007) By Liebowitz, Stan J.

  1. By: Martinez, Catalina (CSIC-IPP, Institute of Public Goods and Policies, Madrid, Spain); Zuniga, Pluvia (UNU-MERIT, and OECD)
    Abstract: Using contract level data, we study the relation between the inclusion of know-how in cross-border patent licensing agreements and the contractual terms used by firms to deal with moral hazard risks. We use official data on international technology contracts with patent licensing terms registered by affiliated and unaffiliated parties before the Department of Technology Transfer of the National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. We find that contracts between unaffiliated parties involving know-how transfer show distinctive contractual and technology features compared to the rest: (i) they involve younger but lower quality technologies (compared to contracts without know-how); (ii) they are more prone to up front lump-sum payments than royalty or combined payments (royalty and fixed); and (iii) they are more likely to be accompanied by the licensing of other IPRs, in addition to patents, such as trademarks.
    Keywords: patents, licensing, know-how, trademarks, technology contracts, Brazil
    JEL: O32 D23 L24
    Date: 2016–11–21
  2. By: Cuihong Fan (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics); Byoung Heon Jun (Korea University, Seoul); Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Humboldt-University at Berlin and Korea University, Seoul)
    Abstract: We reconsider the inside innovators’ optimal licensing problem, assuming incomplete information and unit cost profiles that may or may not have the potential to propel a monopoly, taking into account restrictions concerning royalty rates and the use of exclusive licenses implied by antitrust rules. We analyze optimal licensing mechanisms using methods developed in the analysis of license auctions with downstream interaction. The optimal mechanism differs significantly from the mechanisms reported in the literature, which assumed complete information or particular cost profiles or probability distributions.
    Keywords: Innovation, licensing, optimal contracts, asymmetric information
    JEL: D21 D43 D44 D45
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Tsvetkova, Alexandra; Thill, Jean-Claude; Conroy, Tessa
    Abstract: This paper distinguishes between internal (produced within the firm) and external (produced by other firms) knowledge and studies the effects of both knowledge types on survival in a cohort of computer and electronic product manufacturing companies started in 1991 in the continental US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Estimation results suggest that innovative companies face lower hazard but this effect seems to be driven by company’s initial characteristics, as producing more knowledge measured by successful patent applications does not translate into a higher likelihood of survival. In contrast, an innovative environment decreases survival likelihood in the whole sample, yet this result appears to be driven by non-patenting establishments. In the subset of non-patenting firms an innovative environment has a strong negative effect on survival whereas no significant relationship is identified in the subset of innovative firms.
    Keywords: Business survival, knowledge creation, patents, innovative environment
    JEL: L63 O3 O51
    Date: 2016–12–23
  4. By: Radhakrishnan, Ravi
    Abstract: This paper considers the prospect of a government patent buyout in a model of endogenous growth. To this end, the author modifies a standard quality ladder growth model by incorporating possibility of imitation, and rent protection activities (RPAs) by the innovator. The government finances the buyout by imposing a per unit sales-tax on the goods. The author shows that in this set-up, patent buyout by the government can lead to higher level of welfare without lowering an economy's growth rate along the balanced path. He highlights two sources of welfare improvement: elimination of monopoly pricing, and reduction in RPAs.
    Keywords: innovation,imitation,patent,growth
    JEL: O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2016
  5. By: Liebowitz, Stan J.
    Abstract: The influential piracy paper by Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, although mainly based on proprietary data, contained an 'important complement' to the main results, consisting of four "quasi-experiments" using publicly available data. This replication examines all of these quasi-experiments, first, by narrowly using identical data and statistical methods, as well as in a broader sense by extending or augmenting the data or methods. This study concludes that none of the four quasi-experiments provide evidence in support of OS' hypothesis that file-sharing has not harmed record sales.
    Keywords: Piracy,File Sharing,Oberholzer-Gee,Strumpf,Sound Recordings,Music,iTunes,Napster
    JEL: Z1 O3 L8
    Date: 2016

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