|
on Intellectual Property Rights |
Issue of 2017‒01‒01
seven papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
By: | Dirk Czarnitzk (KU Leuven, Belgium); Thorsten Doherr (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim); Paula Schliessler (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim); Katrin Hussinger (CREA, Université du Luxembourg); Andrew Toole (US Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, USA) |
Abstract: | We use an exogenous change in German Federal law to examine how entrepreneurial support and the ownership of patent rights influence academic entrepreneurship. In 2002, the German Federal Government enacted a major reform called Knowledge Creates Markets that set up new infrastructure to facilitate university-industry technology transfer and shifted the ownership of patent rights from university researchers to their universities. Based on a novel researcher-level panel database that includes a control group not affected by the policy change, we find no evidence that the new infrastructure resulted in an increase in start-up companies by university researchers. The shift in patent rights may have strengthened the relationship between patents on university-discovered inventions and university start-ups; however, it substantially decreased the volume of patents with the largest decrease taking place in faculty-firm patenting relationships. |
Keywords: | Intellectual property, patents, technology transfer, policy evaluation |
JEL: | O34 O38 |
Date: | 2016 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:16-23&r=ipr |
By: | Keiichi Kishi (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
Abstract: | We develop a Schumpeterian growth model based on technology diffu- sion. Each rm has a different productivity level. New entrants enter into the targeted industries by learning the existing technologies owned by the other rms. Some of the new entrants succeed to adopt the frontier tech- nology. The other new entrants may adopt the non-frontier technologies. We show that if it is extremely difficult to adopt the frontier technology, the technology diffusion generates the Pareto distributions of rm size, productivity, and innovation size. Further, we introduce the minimum innovation size required for a patent into the model. That is, the patent office grants the patents only for superior inventions. We show that an increase in minimum innovation size may reduce the average patentable innovation size because of an endogenous response of the distribution of innovation size. This implies that if the patent office requires the superior innovations for the patents, it may cause innovators to produce a larger amount of inferior patentable innovations. |
Keywords: | Technology diffusion, Innovation, Pareto distribution |
JEL: | O30 O33 O34 |
Date: | 2016–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1631&r=ipr |
By: | Declan Conway; Antoine Dechezlepretre; Ivan Haščič; Nick Johnstone |
Abstract: | This paper identifies over 50 000 patents filed worldwide in various water-related technologies between 1990 and 2010, distinguishing between those related to availability (supply) and conservation (demand) technologies. Patenting activity is analysed – including inventive activity by country and technology, international diffusion of such water-related technologies, and international collaboration in technology development. Three results stand out from our analysis. First, although inventive activity in water-related technologies has been increasing over the last two decades, this growth has been disproportionately concentrated on supply-side technologies. Second, whilst 80% of water-related invention worldwide occurs in countries with low or moderate water scarcity, several countries with absolute or chronic water scarcity are relatively specialized in water efficiency technologies. Finally, although we observe a positive correlation between water scarcity and local filings of water patents, some countries with high water availability, in particular Switzerland or Norway, nevertheless appear as significant markets for water-efficiency technologies. This suggests that drivers other than local demand, like regulation and social and cultural factors, play a role in explaining the global flows of technologies. And finally, the extent to which innovation is "internationalised" shows some distinct patterns relative to those observed for innovation in technologies in general. |
Keywords: | water security; resource scarcity; invention; international technology diffusion |
JEL: | Q25 Q31 Q55 |
Date: | 2015–12–15 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:62607&r=ipr |
By: | Schankerman, Mark; Schütt, Florian (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
Abstract: | We develop an integrated framework to study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening. We focus on four key policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that there are important complementarities among these instruments, and identify conditions under which they can be used to achieve either partial or complete screening. We simulate the model to study the welfare effects of different policy reforms. We show that intensifying patent office examination, frontloading patent fees and capping litigation costs all generate welfare gains, while replacing examination with a pure registration system reduces welfare. |
Keywords: | innovation; patents; screening; litigation; courts; patent fees |
JEL: | D82 K41 L24 O31 O34 O38 |
Date: | 2016 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fa319822-6e68-4e05-8547-4915d4090458&r=ipr |
By: | Gaetan de Rassenfosse (Ecole polytechnique federale de Lausanne); Martin Kracker (European Patent Office); Gianluca Tarasconi (Universita Bocconi) |
Abstract: | This paper provides a technical introduction to the PATSTAT Register database, which contains bibliographical, procedural and legal status data on patent applications handled by the European Patent Office. It presents eight MySQL queries that cover some of the most relevant aspects of the database for research purposes. It targets academic researchers and practitioners who are familiar with the PATSTAT database and the MySQL language. |
Keywords: | patent indicator, PATSTAT, licensing, opposition |
JEL: | O34 O38 |
Date: | 2017–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iip:wpaper:3&r=ipr |
By: | Maria D. Tito |
Abstract: | In this paper, we revisit the link between innovation activity, measured by the number of patent applications, and import flows. |
Date: | 2016–12–16 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfn:2016-12-16&r=ipr |
By: | Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman |
Abstract: | Despite much theoretical attention over the concept of procrastination and much exploration of this phenomenon in laboratory settings, there remain few empirical investigations into procrastination in real world contexts, especially in the workplace. In this paper, we attempt to fill these gaps by exploring procrastination among U.S. patent examiners. We find that nearly half of examiners’ first substantive reports are completed immediately prior to the operable deadlines. Moreover, we find a range of additional empirical markers to support that this “endloading” of reviews results from a model of procrastination rather than various time-consistent models of behavior. In one such approach, we take advantage of the natural experiment afforded by the Patent Office’s staggered implementation of its telecommuting program, a development that we theorize might exacerbate employee self-control problems. Supporting the procrastination theory, we estimate an immediate spike in application endloading and other indicia of procrastination upon the onset of telecommuting. Finally, we assess the consequences of procrastination for the quality of the completed reviews. This analysis suggests that the primary harm stemming from procrastination is delay in the ultimate application process, with rushed reviews completed at deadlines resulting in the need for revisions in subsequent rounds of review. |
JEL: | D03 J01 K0 O34 |
Date: | 2016–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22987&r=ipr |