nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2016‒12‒18
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Optimal Taxation and R&D Policies By Ufuk Akcigit; Douglas Hanley; Stefanie Stantcheva
  2. Does stronger protection of intellectual property have effect on trade? By Odilova, Shoirahon
  3. Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees and the Courts By Schankerman, Mark; Schuett, Florian
  4. Hospitals and the generic versus brand-name prescription decision in the outpatient sector By Gerald J. Pruckner; Thomas Schober

  1. By: Ufuk Akcigit; Douglas Hanley; Stefanie Stantcheva
    Abstract: We study the optimal design of R&D policies and corporate taxation when the outputs of innovation are not appropriable in the absence of intellectual property rights policies and there are non-internalized technology spillovers across firms. Firms are heterogeneous in their research productivity, i.e., in the efficiency with which they convert a given set of R&D inputs into successful innovations. There is asymmetric information about firm productivity and about its stochastic evolution over time that prevents the first best solution to the technology spillover. The problem is thus posed as one of dynamic mechanism design with externalities. We characterize the optimal constrained efficient allocations over firms' life cycles and for firms of different productivities. We show that the constrained efficient allocations can be implemented either by a patent system plus a price subsidy for the monopolists' products, together with a parsimonious R&D subsidy function or, equivalently, by a prize mechanism. We estimate our model using firm-level data matched to patent data and quantify the optimal policies. Simpler innovation policies, such as linear R&D subsidies and linear profit taxes, lead to large revenue losses relative to the optimal mechanism.
    JEL: H0 H2 H21 H23 H25 O0 O31 O32 O33 O38
    Date: 2016–12
  2. By: Odilova, Shoirahon
    Abstract: In thus study we explore the association between patent protection and international trade, using data for 114 countries for the 2010-2015 years. Our results suggest non-linear (inverted U shape) link between IPR protection index and trade as a share of GDP.
    Keywords: trade; IPR; copyright; patents
    JEL: F1
    Date: 2016–12–10
  3. By: Schankerman, Mark; Schuett, Florian
    Abstract: We develop an integrated framework to study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening. We focus on four key policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that there are important complementarities among these instruments, and identify conditions under which they can be used to achieve either partial or complete screening. We simulate the model to study the welfare effects of different policy reforms. We show that intensifying patent office examination, frontloading patent fees and capping litigation costs all generate welfare gains, while replacing examination with a pure registration system reduces welfare.
    Keywords: courts; innovation; litigation; patent fees; patents; screening
    JEL: D82 K41 L24 O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2016–12
  4. By: Gerald J. Pruckner; Thomas Schober
    Abstract: Healthcare payers try to reduce costs by promoting the use of cheaper generic drugs. We show strong interrelations in drug prescriptions between the inpatient and outpatient sectors by using a large administrative dataset from Austria. Patients with prior hospital visits have a significantly lower probability of receiving a generic drug in the outpatient sector. The size of the effect depends on both the patient and doctor characteristics, which could be related to the differences in hospital treatment and heterogeneity in the physicians’ adherence to hospital choices. Our results suggest that hospital decisions create spillover costs in healthcare systems with separate funding for inpatient and outpatient care.
    Keywords: Prescription decision, generic drugs, physician behavior, hospitals.
    JEL: I11 I13 I18 H51
    Date: 2016–11

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