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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2016‒11‒27
three papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Llobet, Gerard; Padilla, Atilano Jorge |
| Abstract: | It has been commonly argued that the decision of a large number of inventors to license complementary patents necessary for the development of a product leads to excessively large royalties. This well-known Cournot-complements or royalty-stacking effect would hurt efficiency and downstream competition. In this paper we show that when we consider patent litigation and introduce heterogeneity in the portfolio of different firms these results change substantially due to what we denote the Inverse Cournot effect. We show that the lower the total royalty that a downstream producer pays, the lower the royalty that patent holders restricted by the threat of litigation of downstream producers will charge. This effect generates a moderation force in the royalty that unconstrained large patent holders will charge that may overturn some of the standard predictions in the literature. Interestingly, though, this effect can be less relevant when all patent portfolios are weak making royalty stacking more important. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property; Patent Licensing; Patent Pools; R&D Investment; Standard Setting Organizations |
| JEL: | L15 L24 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11624&r=ipr |
| By: | Vahagn Jerbeshian |
| Abstract: | I model knowledge (patent) licensing and evaluate intellectual property regulation in an endogenous growth framework where the engine of growth is in-house R&D performed by high-tech firms. I show that high-tech firms innovate more and economic growth is higher when there is knowledge licensing, and when intellectual property regulation facilitates excludability of knowledge, than when knowledge is not excludable and there are knowledge spillovers among high-tech firms. However, the number of high-tech firms is lower, and welfare is not necessarily higher, when there is knowledge licensing than when there are knowledge spillovers. |
| Keywords: | knowledge licensing; in-house R&D; intellectual property regulation; endogenous growth; welfare; |
| JEL: | O31 O34 L16 L50 O41 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp566&r=ipr |
| By: | Schwab, Thomas; Todtenhaupt, Maximilian |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes externalities of patent box regimes in Europe. Tax reductions in foreign affiliates of a firm that also provide a profit shifting opportunity reduce the user cost of capital and thereby increase domestic investment. We test this mechanism for the case of research activity. By combining information on patents, firm ownership data and specific characteristics of patent box regimes, we show that patent box regimes without nexus requirements for tax-efficient reallocation of patent profits induce positive spillovers within multinational groups. The implementation of a patent box in a country one of the foreign affiliates of a firm resides, increases domestic research activity by about 74 percent or 2 percent per implied tax rate differential. Furthermore, our findings suggest that patent boxes generate negative spillovers on average patent quality. This has important implications for international tax policy and the evaluation of patent box regimes. |
| Keywords: | patent box,spillover,corporate taxation,innovation |
| JEL: | F23 H25 O31 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16073&r=ipr |