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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2016‒07‒30
two papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Heng GENG (University of Hong Kong); Harald HAU (University of Geneva and Swiss Finance Institute); Sandy LAI (University of Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | Innovation processes under patent protection generate holdup problems if complementary patents are owned by different firms. We show that in line with Hart and Moore (1990), shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such holdup problems and correlates significantly with higher patent investment and more patent success as measured by future citations. The positive innovation effect is strongest for concentrated overlapping ownership and for the cases when the overlapping shareholders are dedicated investors. |
| Keywords: | Patents, holdup Problems, Innovation, Institutional Ownership |
| JEL: | L22 G31 G32 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1539&r=ipr |
| By: | Odilova, Shoirahon; Xiaomin, Gu |
| Abstract: | Extant literature on the link between patent protection and economic growth have yielded inconclusive results. In this study, we aim to engage in this debate by conjecturing that intelligence moderates the effect of patent protection on economic growth. Using annual data of 88 nations from 1970 to 2013 we find that patent protection has positive effect on growth only after accounting for the interaction between IQ and IPR. Indeed, we find that the interaction term is negative and statistically significant suggesting that countries with higher level of intelligence (above 90 points) can offset the negative effect of weak IPR protection. The results remain robust for a battery of robustness tests. |
| Keywords: | IQ; intelligence; patent protection; economic growth |
| JEL: | F0 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:71226&r=ipr |