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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2016‒04‒04
five papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Severin Frank (University of Marburg); Wolfgang Kerber (University of Marburg) |
| Abstract: | Patent settlements between originator and generic firms in the pharmaceutical industry have been challenged by antitrust and competition authorities in the U.S. and the EU. Particularly settlements with large "reverse payments" to generic firms raise the concern of collusive behaviour for protecting weak patents and delaying price competition through generic entry and therefore harming consumers. However, it is still heavily disputed under what conditions such patent settlements are anticompetitive and violate antitrust rules. This article scrutinizes critically what economic analysis has so far contributed to our knowledge about the effects of these patent settlements and the possible rules for their antitrust treatment. An important claim of this paper is that the problem of patent settlements can only be understood, if we analyze it not only from a narrow antitrust perspective but also take into account its deep interrelationship with the problems (and the economics) of the patent system. Therefore we identify three different channels of effects, how patent settlements can influence consumer welfare: (1) price effects, (2) innovation incentive effects, and (3) effects via the incentives to challenge weak patents. The paper critically analyzes the existing economic studies and identifies a number of research gaps, especially also in regard to trade offs between different effects. It also suggests that policy solutions for these patent settlements should also be sought in combination with patent law solutions. |
| Keywords: | Patent settlements, probabilistic patents, weak patents, pharmaceutical industry, generic competition |
| JEL: | K40 L40 O34 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201601&r=ipr |
| By: | Rudi Bekkers; Arianna Martinelli; Federico Tamagni |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal effect of a recent attempt undertaken by the EPO to improve the quality of the patent granting process. To do so we examine a policy change that aimed at including the information revealed during the standardisation-setting process into the official definition of prior art. All the empirical analysis consistently support that the policy was successful. Indeed, we find a negative and strongly significant reduction in the granting rate, suggesting that the process of patent granting has become more careful and selective after the policy implementation. |
| Keywords: | Quality of patent granting, technological standards, policy evaluation |
| Date: | 2016–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2016/11&r=ipr |
| By: | Yagi, Michiyuki; Managi, Shunsuke |
| Abstract: | This study examines time-period and industry heterogeneity of innovation activity in Japan from 1964 to 2006 using patent data and non-consolidated firm data. This study focuses on the following three periods, based on changes of the Japanese patent system, in and non-manufacturing industries: I) before 1976; II) 1976–1987; and III) after 1988. Specifically, for each degree of patent protection in each industry, this study examines how innovation activities are affected by the following determinants found in the innovation literature: size, market competition, and search variety (depth and scope). Empirical results show that when using the entire sample from 1964 to 2006, the size effect on innovation is significantly positive. In addition, the effects of market competition and search variety on innovation are inverse-U. When considering time-period heterogeneity, the effects of size and search variety are similar to the entire period; however, the inverse-U effect of market competition is broken after 1988. On the other hand, when considering industry heterogeneity, the effects of size and search variety are similar to the entire sample, but differ between manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. In addition, the effect of market competition is not statistically significant in either industry. |
| Keywords: | Patent; Inverse-U relationship; Competition; Search for variety |
| JEL: | L10 L40 O31 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70207&r=ipr |
| By: | Tetsugen Haruyama (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1613&r=ipr |
| By: | Hong Luo; Julie Holland Mortimer |
| Abstract: | Effective dispute resolution is important for reducing private and social costs. We study how resolution responds to changes in price and communication using a new, extensive dataset of copyright infringement incidences by firms. The data cover two field experiments run by a large stock-photography agency. We find that substantially reducing the requested amount generates a small increase in the settlement rate. However, for the same reduced request, a message informing infringers of the price reduction and acknowledging possible unintentionality generates a large increase in settlement; including a deadline further increases the response. The small price effect, compared to the large message effect, can be explained by two countervailing effects of a lower price: an inducement to settle early, but a lower threat of escalation. Furthermore, acknowledging possible unintentionality may encourage settlement due to the typically inadvertent nature of these incidences. The resulting higher settlement rate prevents additional legal action and reduces social costs. |
| JEL: | L0 M2 O30 O34 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22082&r=ipr |